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Libertà di pensiero, 
è libertà di movimento 
 
 
Freedom of thinking, 
is freedom of moving. 
 
Lorenzo Amurri 
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ABSTRACT 
A successful human-environment interaction requires a continuous integration of information 
concerning body parts, object features and affective dynamics. Multiple neuropsychological 
studies show that tools can be integrated into the representation of one's own body. In 
particular, a tool that participates in the conscious movement of the person is added to the 
dynamic representation the body – often called “Body schema” – and may even affect social 
interaction. In light of this the wheelchair is treated as an extension of the disabled body, 
essentially replacing limbs that don't function properly, but it can also be a symbol of frailty 
and weakness. 
In a series of experiments, I studied plastic changes of action, tool and body representation in 
individuals with spinal cord injury (SCI). Due to their peripheral loss of sensorimotor 
functions, in the absence of brain lesions and spared higher order cognitive functions, these 
patients represent an excellent model to study this topic in a multi-faceted way, investigating 
both fundamental mechanisms and possible therapeutic interventions. 
In a series of experiments, I developed new behavioral methods to measure the 
phenomenological aspects of tool embodiment (Chapter 3), to study its functional and neural 
correlates (Chapter 4) and to assess the possible computational model underpinning these 
phenomena (Chapter 5). These tasks have been used to describe changes in tool, action and 
body representation following the injury (Chapter 3 and 4), but also social interactions 
(Chapter 7), with the aim of giving a complete portrait of change following such damage. 
I found that changes in the function (wheelchair use) and the structure (body brain 
disconnection) of the physical body, plastically modulate tool, action and body representation. 
Social context and social interaction are also shaped by the new configuration of bodily 
representations. Such a high degree of plasticity suggests that our sense of body is not given 
at once, but rather it is constantly constructed and adapted through experience. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to address functional and plastic properties of body and action 
representation, as well as changes in tool embodiment process, in patients with spinal cord 
injuries. Due to their peripheral loss of sensorimotor functions, in the absence of brain lesions 
and spared higher order cognitive functions, these patients represent an excellent model to 
study this topic in a multi-faceted way, investigating both fundamental mechanisms as well as 
possible therapeutic interventions. These patients show significant changes in peripheral 
sensorimotor processing, as well as important cortical reorganization in sensorimotor areas 
(Henderson et al., 2011), which are thought to be basic for the bodily self and related 
cognition. Such changes are thus likely to evoke disturbances in the body schema (Curt et al., 
2011), the body image (Fuentes et al., 2013); tool embodiment (Papadimitriou, 2008) or 
action representation. Clinical characteristics of the spinal cord and consequences of its 
damage have been reviewed in Chapter 1. 
Nonetheless, little is known about the perceptual changes in the embodiment process and its 
underlying neural mechanisms in these patients. Even less is known about how these changes 
influence higher-level embodied cognitions such as social interaction. In order to successfully 
interact with people and objects in the world the brain requires to continuously integrating 
information concerning body parts, object features and socio-affective dynamics in the 
environment. Two different models are thought to support this function: a dynamic 
representation of the body, i.e. Body Image (BI), and an online, constantly updated, action-
orientated multisensory representation of the body schema (BS) that is critical for action. One 
of the critical features of these representations is that both BI and BS are not fixed, but they 
dynamically change depending on different types of experience. The connection of the self to 
the body (often termed “embodiment”) is one of the most essential aspects of human 
consciousness and has been the subject of various influential philosophical (e.g., Descartes, 
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James, Merlot-Ponty) and, more recently, neuroscientific theories (e.g., Damasio). These 
recent theories converge in term of their emphasis of the great relevance of bodily 
sensorimotor processes (i.e. the non-conceptual representations and processing of body-
related information) in higher-level cognition and self-consciousness, as well as in the 
interactions with external objects and people. These basic sensorimotor processes are 
peripherally and profoundly disturbed in patients with spinal cord injuries, leading also to 
important structural and functional cortical reorganization in the respective cortical areas 
(Henderson et al., 2011). Properties and features of these processes and representations, as 
well as the theoretical background inspiring my research, have been reviewed in Chapter 2.  
In the experimental section of this dissertation, behavioral and functional properties of these 
plastic representations have been investigated using different methods. In particular, in 
Chapter 3 the bodily assimilation of a relevant external tool as a consequence of altered 
sensory and motor inputs from the body and of prolonged confinement in the wheelchair has 
been studied, while in Chapter 4 I presented a new matching-to-sample auditory 
discrimination paradigm specifically developed to investigate whether profound alterations in 
sensorimotor traffic between the body and brain influence audio-motor representations. 
Moreover, as suggested by a new computetional model, in order to compute the decision 
process for auditory recognition, individuals integrate information considering both the 
memory of a motor-action repertoire and the memory of the perceptual features of the sound 
repertoire. In Chapter 5 I presented an experiment run to test this computational hypothesis. 
In a second series of experiments I focused on the way in which the dramatic change in body 
representation that occur after a sudden transformation in the structure of the physical body, 
such as the spinal cord injury, assume a role in social and affective dynamics as a function of 
different types of experiences.  Particularly, in Chapter 6 I investigated how our perception of 
individuals on wheelchair is shaped by social experience. I firstly explored the presence of 
implicit stereotypes toward wheelchair-bound patients with spinal cord injury by means of an 
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ad hoc devised version of the Implicit Association Test. Subsequently, I focused on a possible 
attenuation of the strength of the implicit disability prejudice through a personal interaction 
with an individual with SCI. Finally, in Chapter 7 I will try to give a general portrait of social 
cognitive and affective neuroscience of this particular clinical population. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPINAL CORD INJURIES: A BRAIN BODY 
DISCONNECTION 
 
The spinal cord is the traditional starting point for a detailed consideration of the central 
nervous system (CNS). It is a uniformly organized part of the CNS, extraordinarily important 
in the day-to-day activities we tend not to think about. In it reside all the motor neurons 
supplying the muscles we use to move our body around, as well as major populations of 
autonomic efferents. It also receives all the sensory input from the body and some from the 
head and performs the initial processing operations on most of these input. 
Spinal cord injuries (SCI) are among the most dramatic causes of immobility also because 
they often affect young people who expect to live for decades in a state of massive sensory 
de-afferentation and motor de-efferentation. Approximately between 180,000 and 250,000 
people is currently living with such injuries in the United States (58% of them aged between 
16 and 30 years) (Cole, 2004). A similar figure is found in Europe although both the 
incidence and prevalence are possibly underestimated (Wyndaele & Wyndaele, 2006). 
Importantly, although these patients have no brain lesions and higher order cognitive 
functions are largely spared, they show significant changes in peripheral sensorimotor 
processing, as well as important cortical reorganization in sensorimotor areas (Henderson et 
al., 2011), which are thought to be basic for the bodily self and related cognition.  
 
1.1 Spinal cord anatomical organization 
An adult human spinal cord appears surprisingly small on first inspection, being only about 
42 to 45 cm long and about 35 g. It begins at the neck and extends down to the low back, 
supported and protected by the vertebral column; it connects the brain to the nerves 
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throughout the body and it is anatomically segmented by the nerve roots attached to it. A 
continuous series of dorsal (posterior) rootlets enter the cord in a shallow longitudinal groove 
(the posterocentral sulcus) in its posterolateral surface; and a continuous series of ventral 
(anterior) rootlets leaves from the poorly defined anterolateral sulcus. The dorsal and ventral 
rootlets from discrete sections of the cord coalesce to form dorsal and ventral roots, which in 
turn join to form spinal nerves. Each dorsal root bears a dorsal root ganglion just proximal to 
the junction between dorsal and ventral roots; it contains the cell bodies of the primary 
sensory neurons whose processes travel through that particular spinal nerve. Each dorsal root 
ganglion remains at the level of the appropriate foramen. Proceeding from the cervical to the 
sacral levels, the dorsal and ventral roots become progressively longer because they have 
longer and longer distances to travel before reaching their sites of exit from the vertebral 
canal. A portion of the cord that gives rise to a spinal nerve constitutes a segment, which 
supplies the upper and lower extremities and therefore contains increased numbers of motor 
neurons and interneurons. The sensory nerves leave the cord and the motor ones enter it 
through nerve roots at each vertebral level. These levels are broadly divided into: the neck or 
cervical (with eight vertebrae and eight root levels); chest, or thoracic (twelve roots); low 
back, or lumbar (five roots); and pelvic area, or sacral (five roots). In cross section the spinal 
cord consists of a roughly H-shaped area of gray matter that floats in a surround of white 
matter. The gray matter can be divided into horns and the white matter into funiculi. Each 
spinal nerve retains its relationship with a somite during the development, with the results that 
spinal cord segments are related systematically with to areas of skin, to muscles, and to 
vertebrae. A group of muscles innervated through a specific part of the spine is called a 
myotome, while a section of the skin innervated through a specific part of the spine is called a 
dermatome. This dermatomal arrangement is particularly apparent in the trunk, where pairs of 
dermatomes form bands that encircle the chest and abdomen. Similarly, the innervation of the 
skeletal muscles is related systematically to spinal segments. Knowledge of the segmental 
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innervations of muscles and cutaneous areas can be extremely helpful in diagnosing the site of 
damage in or near the spinal cord. In addition the highest level of a sensory or motor deficit 
may allow deductions about the segmental level of a suspected spinal cord lesion. 
 
1.2 Phenomenology of spinal cord injuries 
 
A spinal cord injury (SCI) refers to any damage to the spinal cord that is caused by trauma 
instead of disease. Depending on where the spinal cord and nerve roots are damaged, the 
symptoms can vary widely (Lin et al., 2002; Kirshblum et al., 2001). The level of an injury is 
described in terms of its roots level. An injury in the cervical area will lead to loss of use of 
arms, trunk, and legs: tetraplegia if complete, or a tetra-paresis if some movement remains. 
Injury to the thoracic, lumbar, and sacral cord leads to loss of movement of the legs but spares 
the arm: paraplegia if complete, or a para-paresis if incomplete. 
Classification of the injury 
Spinal cord injuries are described at various levels as "incomplete", which can vary from 
having no effect on the patient, or "complete", which mean a total loss of function. Retaining 
sensation and functions in the very lowest region of the spine, the sacral region, indicates that 
the spinal cord is only partially damaged. An incomplete spinal cord injury involves 
preservation of motor or sensory function below the level of injury in the spinal cord (Ho et 
al., 2007). This includes a phenomenon known as sacral sparing which involves the 
preservation of cutaneous sensation in the sacral dermatomes, even though sensation is 
impaired in the thoracic and lumbar dermatomes below the level of the lesion (Lafuente et al., 
1995). Sacral sparing has been attributed to the lamination of fibers within the spinal cord and 
to the idea that the sacral spinal pathways are not as likely as the other spinal pathways to 
become compressed after injury (Lafuente et al., 1995). While the prognosis of complete 
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injuries are generally predictable since recovery, the symptoms of incomplete injuries can 
vary and it is difficult to make an accurate prediction of the outcome.  
The American Spinal Injury Association (ASIA) first published an international classification 
of spinal cord injury in 1982, called the International Standards for Neurological and 
Functional Classification of Spinal Cord Injury. Now in its sixth edition, the International 
Standards for Neurological Classification of Spinal Cord Injury (ISNCSCI) is still widely 
used to document sensory and motor impairments following SCI (Marino et al., 2003). It is 
based on neurological responses, touch and pinprick sensations tested in each dermatome, and 
strength of the muscles that control ten key motions on both sides of the body, including hip 
flexion (L2), shoulder shrug (C4), elbow flexion (C5), wrist extension (C6), and elbow 
extension (C7). Traumatic spinal cord injury is classified into five categories on the ASIA 
Impairment Scale: 
• A indicates a "complete" spinal cord injury where no motor or sensory function is preserved 
in the sacral segments S4-S5. 
• B indicates an "incomplete" spinal cord injury where sensory but not motor function is 
preserved below the neurological level and includes the sacral segments S4-S5. This is 
typically a transient phase and if the person recovers any motor function below the 
neurological level, that person essentially becomes a motor incomplete, i.e. ASIA C or D. 
• C indicates an "incomplete" spinal cord injury where motor function is preserved below the 
neurological level and more than half of key muscles below the neurological level have a 
muscle grade of less than 3, which indicates active movement with full range of motion 
against gravity. 
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• D indicates an "incomplete" spinal cord injury where motor function is preserved below the 
neurological level and at least half of the key muscles below the neurological level have a 
muscle grade of 3 or more. 
• E indicates "normal" where motor and sensory scores are normal. Note that it is possible to 
have spinal cord injury and neurological deficits with completely normal motor and sensory 
scores. 
Dimitrijevic (1988) proposed a further class, the so-called discomplete lesion, which is 
clinically complete but is accompanied by neurophysiological evidence of residual brain 
influence on spinal cord function below the lesion (Sherwood et al., 1992). 
Phases of the injury 
Any spinal cord injury may be temporary or permanent. Most injuries involve some initial 
swelling as well as more serious damage. Then some recovery may occur, which is one reason 
why prognosis can initially be difficult. According to the arrangement of the cord in cross 
section (with nerve fibers involved in touch and movement sensation in its upper half and 
fibers involved in movement, pain and temperature sensation in the lower half) it is possible 
to have a cord syndrome with loss of movement and pain/temperature sensory loss but some 
touch sensation remaining, or one in which movement remains but touch and position sense 
are lost. Usually, though, the impairment is not so neat as this, and some or all of both are 
affected to varying amounts. Despite this, it is possible to identify a typical sequence of 
clinical events resulting from the trauma. The muscles may contract uncontrollably, become 
weak, or be completely unresponsive. The loss of muscle function can have additional effects 
if the muscle is not used, including atrophy of the muscle and bone degeneration. Spinal cord 
transection eventually leads to spastic (upper motor neuron) paralysis below the level of the 
damage. This is preceded by a stage of spinal shock that may last for weeks, characterized by 
more or less completely flaccid paralysis. Deep tendon reflexes then begin to return and 
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finally become hyperactive. Lesser degrees of spinal shock may occur even in cases of 
contusion of the spinal cord. The mechanism of spinal shock is not completely understood but 
the whole sequence of the events is thought to been a consequence of interruption of fibers 
from the brainstem and cerebellum descending to spinal cord motor neurons and interneurons. 
Multiple mechanisms contribute to the transition from spinal shock to spasticity. Early on, 
spinal cord neurons probably upregulate their complements of transmitter receptors and 
become abnormally sensitive. Later stages of the transition are thought to involve the 
formation of new synaptic connections. The degeneration of the endings of descending fibers 
leaves vacant synaptic sites at various places on motor neurons and interneurons, adjacent to 
intact reflex connections. Multiplication of these reflex connections to fill up the vacated sites 
would be expected to increase the sensitivity and magnitude of reflexes. Spinal shock 
followed by long-term hyperreflexia affects autonomic functions as well.  
 
Spinal cord damage causes predictable deficits  
The functions of the cord are reflected in the neurological impairments following damage to 
it. Determining the exact "level" of injury is critical in making accurate predictions about the 
specific parts of the body that may be affected by paralysis and loss of function (see Table 
1.1). Signs recorded by a physician and symptoms experienced by a patient will vary 
depending on where the spine is injured and the extent of the injury. Impairments may be 
divided into movement and motor function, to voluntary muscles as well as to the breathing 
system, gut, bladder, and blood vessels, and sensory function to skin, muscles, and internal 
organs. Because different sensory and motor nerves pass in and out at each level and because 
the cord is the relay of fibers to and from the brain, the level of injury is crucial. Individuals 
injured at C1 and C2 will have no movement and sensation below the head. They will be 
dependent on a respirator because the nerves controlling breathing exit at C3. C3 tetraplegics 
may be able to control an electric wheelchair via a head control, but will still need assistance 
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with the breathing. People with a C4 lesion may be able to breathe unaided using the 
diaphragm, though they will still have lost chest wall movement and have reduced expansion 
of the lungs. A C5 lesion will allow some movement of the shoulders and of biceps, allowing 
elbow flexion, but no power to straighten the elbow. C6 adds movement of the wrist upwards, 
though still not use of the hands. A person may be able to transfer in and out of a wheelchair. 
A C7 level allows independence with elbow extension aiding transfers, though finger 
movements that are controlled by C8 and T1 are still not normal. For a C8 tetraplegic 
independence might be expected. Additional signs and symptoms of cervical injuries include: 
inability or reduced ability to regulate heart rate, blood pressure, sweating and hence body 
temperature; autonomic dysreflexia or abnormal increases in blood pressure, sweating, and 
other autonomic responses to pain or sensory disturbances. 
In thoracic injuries and below people are paraplegic. In T1 to T8 lesions, trunk muscles as 
well as chest wall breathing are lost, leading to difficulties in balance in a wheelchair, which 
are shared with all tetraplegics. Lesions around T8 and below have effects mainly on leg and 
hip muscles. 
 
To conclude, the cord damage may differ in completeness, duration and most importantly in 
level. The neurological impairment confronts each person with a huge loss, however, each 
person’s response to it varies hugely.  
Additonal clinical information can be found in Appendix A. 
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Table 1.1 Relationship between the nerve level of the SCI and movement.  
 
1.3 Brain plasticity after spinal cord injury 
Reorganization of brain function in people with CNS damage has been identified as one of the 
fundamental mechanisms involved in the recovery of sensory-motor function. Unlike cortical 
injuries, the brain remains largely intact after SCI, providing a unique opportunity to use 
mapping techniques to examine cortical and subcortical reorganization in an intact brain after 
a distal CNS neurotrauma. The impact of traumatic spinal cord injury on structural integrity, 
cortical reorganization and ensuing disability is variable and may depend on a dynamic 
interaction between the severity of local damage and the capacity of the brain for plastic 
reorganization. Intuitively, greater damage to the spinal cord induces greater cortical 
reorganization that relates quantitatively to disability. Several studies have demonstrated that 
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functional and structural cortical reorganization occurs following deafferentation 
(Bruehlmeier et al., 1998; Freund et al., 2011a; Freund et ale 2011b; Henderson et al., 2011; 
Moore et al., 2000; Wrigley et al., 2009). Specifically, subjects with SCI who recover 
functionally (Jurkiewicz et al., 2006) or who undergo surgical decompression (Duggal et al., 
2010) show increases in the volume of activation in primary motor cortex. Increased cerebral 
activation during lower limb movement is correlated with spinal atrophy and impairment 
assessed by the American Spinal Injury Associations score (Lundell et al., 2011b). 
Analogously, subjects with SCI who do not recover show a reduced volume of activation in 
primary motor cortex (Jurkiewicz et al., 2010). 
Reorganization of cortical networks in the brain can occur spontaneously after neurological 
injury. Several aspects of reorganization of brain function following SCI resembled those 
reported in stroke. Although SCI does not involve direct injury to cortical neurons, a spinal 
cord lesion affects primary sensorimotor areas connected to the damaged area and can result 
in reorganization of these and surrounding regions in order to compensate for sensorimotor 
loss (Jain et al., 1997; Donoghue et al., 1990). The brain reorganization that occurs can be 
dependent on both structural and functional changes. Structural changes may include synaptic 
alterations, such as the change in length and diameter of existing dendritic branches or the 
growth of new branches, providing the opportunity for new synapses (Bayona et al., 2005). 
Functional, changes may include modification of neuronal activity, synaptic efficacy (Dunlop, 
2008), or increases in astrocyte activity (Kolb et al., 1995). Moreover, it appears that cortical 
reorganization is particularly associated with the growth of new intracortical connections 
(Pons et al., 1991). Henderson et al (2011) found that a primary somatosensory cortex (S1) 
reorganization of the hand area, towards the deafferented leg area, was associated with grey 
matter preservation and decreased fractional anisotropy. This expansion may be related to 
rewiring of axotomized hind limb neurons onto cervical motor circuits (Ghosh et al., 2010), 
driven by compensatory use of a less affected part of the body, similar to that seen following 
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rehabilitative training after stroke (Nudo et al., 1996) or overuse (Elbert et al., 1995). 
However, an alternative interpretation could be that greater disability induces greater cortical 
reorganization but that this does not translate into functional gain.  
These changes in cortical organization may occur secondary to altered spinothalamic and 
spinocerebellar input, and presumably reflect the adaptation of cortical maps to altered inputs 
(Bruehlmeier et al., 1998). Spinal cord atrophy represents the endpoint of neurodegeneration 
resulting from an accumulation of multiple pathophysiological events, such as axonal 
degeneration and demyelination, axonal dieback and neuronal loss (Dusart and Schwab, 
1994). Overall, the reduction of subcortical white matter volume in the corticospinal tract and 
cortical grey matter volume and cortical thinning in primary motor cortex is indicative of 
atrophy due to retrograde degeneration (Hains et al., 2003; Beaud et al., 2008), but could also 
arise from decreased cortical connectivity due to a reduction in dendritic spine density (Kim 
et al., 2006) or a reduction in angiogenesis (Fields, 2008). Atrophy of neurons in primary 
sensory cortex may be induced through reduced cellular activity, triggered by trans neuronal 
degeneration (Jones, 2000).  
It is incredibly important to understand if this well documented brain plasticity finds its 
functional correlate in different aspects of cognition, affection and social behavior. Although 
sensory information clearly influences body image (Gandevia & Phegan, 1999; Paqueron et 
al., 2003) the conscious body model may be only indirectly linked to primary sensory areas. 
Instead, this body representation is thought to predominately arise from the posterior parietal 
cortex (PPC) and to depend strongly on visual input. Phantom limb studies in amputees, for 
example, show that perceived movement of the phantom limb is associated with increased 
activity in PPC (Kew et al., 1994) and other non-painful phantom sensations are more linked 
to changes in PPC than SI (Flor et al., 2000). Furthermore, in some cases, lesions in the PPC 
can suppress the experience of phantom limbs (Melzack & Bromage, 1973) and can induce 
asomatognosia, a condition in which parts of the body feel as though they have disappeared 
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(Salanova et al., 1995; Wolpert et al., 1998). Other studies have shown that the left PPC is 
involved with processing spatial information about bodies (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2008; 
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2009; Felician et al., 2009). Patients with damage to the left PPC 
can exhibit autotopagnosia, an inability to localize and orient different parts of the body while 
maintaining the ability to identify body parts (Buxbaum et al., 2001; Pick, 1922). Despite 
cortical reorganization of primary somatosensory areas, chronic sensorimotor loss may in fact 
not affect the body image, as higher level areas such as the PPC are generally unaltered 
following SCI. Indeed, a patient with total large fiber deafferentation below the neck was 
assumed to rely on a (visual) body image to compensate for the complete absence of 
proprioceptive or body schema input (Gallagher & Cole, 1995). It is critical to note that 
reorganization will be different in individuals with paraplegia compared to tetraplegia during 
upper limb movement. Brain activation with upper limb movements in individuals with 
paraplegia involve the intact arms/hands, which are above the level of lesion, whereas brain 
activation in individuals with tetraplegia will involve attempted or imagined movement below 
the level of lesion.  
If brain networks involved in different demands of motor control remain responsive even in 
chronic paralysis, therapeutic strategies aiming for restoring spinal cord function even in 
people with chronic SCI should be shaped on a preserved competent brain control.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Spinal cord injuries (SCI) are among the most dramatic causes of immobility also because 
they often affect young people who expect to live for decades in a state of massive sensory 
de-afferentation and motor de-efferentation. From a neuroscientific point of view, although 
these patients have no brain lesions and higher order cognitive functions are largely spared, 
they show significant changes in peripheral sensorimotor processing, as well as important 
cortical reorganization in sensorimotor areas (Henderson et al., 2011), which are thought to be 
basic for the bodily self and related cognition. Such changes are thus likely to evoke 
disturbances in the body schema (Curt et al., 2011); the body image (Fuentes et al., 2013), and  
tool embodiment (Papadimitriou 2008; Standal 2011; Arnhoff & Mehl 1963; Higuchi et al., 
2006; Higuchi et al., 2009; Olsson 2012; Winance 2006a; Winance 2006b). Nonetheless, little 
is known about these perceptual and cognitive functions and their underlying neural 
mechanisms in these patients. Even less is known about how these changes influence higher-
level embodied cognitions such as e.g. empathy and social interaction. The aim of this 
dissertation is to give a portrait of the complex changes occurring in different aspects of 
cognition, affection and social behavior in these patients after such damage, trying to consider 
both structural and functional adaptation, as well as social and psychological dynamics. 
 
2.1 Nomenclature of body representations 
Sensory signals from receptors in the skin, muscles, and joints provide information about 
body position (Burgess et al., 1982). This sense of body position – termed proprioception 
(Sherrington, 1906) – helps form a mental representation of the body. However, since no 
 22 
afferent information specifies shape and size of the body, a model of the body must exist 
beyond sensory information. The characteristics of this body model have only recently begun 
to be explored. There is little agreement in literature about the number and types of body 
representations in the brain. The first distinction was proposed by Head and Holmes (1911), 
by studying impairments in tactile perception in a brain damaged patient suffering from a 
surgical ablation of part of the precentral gyrus. Head and Holmes found that the brain lesion 
affected patient’s ability to localize the position of his hand in space, leaving unaffected the 
ability to localize, by naming it, a tactile stimulus at the hand. Head and Holmes introduced a 
dyadic distinction between a Postural Schema, a representation of the position of the body 
parts in space, used for action execution and updating of postural changes, and Superficial 
Schema, a model of the skin surface used for localizing bodily and tactile sensations. After 
this seminal paper, different taxonomies of body representations have been proposed, based 
on the different kinds of body-related information. The currently most accepted taxonomy 
poses a dyadic distinction between Body Schema and Body Image. Body Schema is generally 
defined as a constantly updated representation of the position of different body parts in space 
in relationship with each other, derived from multiple sensory (proprioceptive, vestibular, 
tactile, visual, auditory, kinesthetic) inputs. It is commonly accepted that Body Schema 
interacts with the motor system in the genesis of actions. The Body Image instead is an 
abstract and stable representation of the body for perception, more related to semantic or 
affective processes, and mainly influenced by visual inputs (de Vignemont, 2010; Gallagher, 
2005; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005). This action-perception duality reminds that originally 
shown in the visual domain (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Mishkin & Ungerleider, 1982), and 
more recently in the auditory (Belin & Zatorre, 2000) and somatosensory domains (Kammers 
et al., 2009; see Dijkerman & De Haan 2007 for a review). 
More recently, Longo and colleagues (2010) proposed a general body model that 
distinguishes between two major classes of high-order body representations, named 
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somatoperception and somatorepresentation. The first term refers to the process of perceiving 
the body itself, while the second one is more related to abstract knowledge, beliefs and 
attitudes towards one’s own body. Some studies have established that conflicting cross-modal 
information (e.g., proprioceptive and tactile information) can alter one’s body model such that 
illusions of body shape and size are perceived (Lackner, 1988). Interestingly, a recent study 
found that conflicting sensory information within one modality (in this case, proprioception) 
can also affect one’s body model: simultaneous extension and flexion signals at a joint can 
cause perceived shrinkage of the limb (Longo et al., 2009). In addition to having a body 
model that reflects our first-person perception of our body, we also maintain a cognitive 
representation of our bodies, which can be thought of as a body image. As opposed to what 
the body is “felt” to be like, this body image reflects what the body is “believed” to be like 
(Longo et al., 2010). While more studies are exploring this area, how sensory information is 
integrated into one’s body model is still not well understood. Studying the effects of sensory 
loss on body representations provides a glimpse into the role played by afferent information. 
Anaesthetizing digits in healthy adults, for example, results in increased perceived size of the 
digit (Gandevia and Phegan, 1999) and size of objects held between digits (Berryman et al., 
2006). The perception of phantom limbs (i.e., the presence of the missing limb) after 
traumatic amputation, on the other hand, often results in shrinkage and telescoping of the 
perceived limb (Henderson and Smyth, 1948).  
Our bodies are our instruments and most of us pay little attention to them. They are usually 
absent from our awareness, just allowing us to do what we like. After spinal cord injury, the 
body is absented, insentient and unmoving, and yet has to be looked after, because it no 
longer functions automatically. Moreover, a sense of agency (or will), as well as feedback of 
movement, seems to be essential to feel at one with one’s body. We also have a conscious 
sense of our appearance, seen in our relations with others and in developing our self-esteem. 
What we look like and how we move, as well as what we say, play a large part in how we are 
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perceived. In our emotional life, as Merleau-Ponty (2002) wrote, “the body is more than a 
means, it is our expression in the world”. For those with spinal cord injury, their bodies and 
hence their worlds might change. The injury may alter the relation to their own body and to 
others in huge and unimagined ways, from knowledge of the body itself to the will to move 
and psychological integrity. Moreover, a tool that extends or restores movement (such as the 
wheelchair) may become part of the identity of the person to whom it belongs. Many 
physiological and psychophysical studies suggest a highly complex relationship between body 
representations and relevant extracorporeal objects (Maravita & Iriki, 2004; Cardinali et al., 
2009; Tsakiris, 2010). 
 
2.2 Wheelchair embodiment 
The extent of body representation is dynamically shaped as a function of subjects’ action in 
the space, with or without the use of external objects (Gallese & Sinigaglia 2010). Some 
authors (Iriki et al., 1996; Maravita & Iriki, 2004) have proposed that the flexibility after tool-
use reflects a modification in body representations, which indeed should be plastic enough to 
update accordingly to slow and fast changes the body undergoes with time. In humans, tool 
use induces plasticity after both short- and long-term learning and practice (Longo & Serino, 
2012), and therefore, perceptual, motor, and cognitive capacities (De Preester, 2011) are 
reformed based on the mode of use (Bassolino et al., 2010). Specifically, if a tool extends the 
able body’s movement potential, the object becomes part of the body (a process known as 
“embodiment”) (Longo & Serino, 2012), distorts the perceived body dimension (Fuentes et 
al., 2013), and alters the sensorimotor state that guides actions (Cardinali et al., 2009; 
Cardinali et al., 2012). 
These bodily changes may result in either a conscious, visual representation of the manner in 
which the body is perceived, known as “body image” (Fuentes et al., 2013) or, on the other 
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hand, potentially update unconscious sensorimotor representations to enable motor control, as 
referred to as “body schema” (de Vignemont, 2010). Behavioral studies have specified that, 
although seeing and touching a tool affirms its embodiment, movement may not be necessary 
(e.g., a rubber hand can be embodied without moving it) (de Vignemont, 2011). However, the 
ability to control movement enhances the feeling of embodiment (Newport & Preston, 2010), 
whereas the inability to control movement prevents it (Tsakiris et al., 2006). When a 
prosthetic device is used for action and constrains the injured physical body to a new position, 
the appropriate extracorporeal tool may be assimilated as a corporeal structure (Cardianli et 
al., 2012; de Vignemont, 2011), influencing the body schema and body image (Fuentes et al., 
2013). For example, patients paralyzed because of spinal cord injury (SCI) may lose 
movement and sensation permanently, thus becoming dependent on a wheelchair for mobility 
and changing their body posture drastically. Influential theoretical models (Papadimitriou 
2008; Standal 2011) and empirical studies (Fuentes et al., 2013; Arnhoff & Mehl 1963; 
Higuchi et al., 2006; Higuchi et al., 2009; Olsson 2012; Winance, 2006a; Winance, 2006b) 
have suggested that, in these cases, the body schema and body image are rearranged to 
incorporate the wheelchair. The experience of wheelchair embodiment has not been evaluated 
using quantitative measurements but, rather, through systematic descriptions of patient 
experiences. No definitive conclusions have been drawn from these studies and reports 
concerning wheelchair embodiment are controversial. Although some patients with SCI 
experience the wheelchair as a corporeal structure, others regard it as an artificial device. For 
example, a male patient who had a complete lesion at the fifth cervical vertebra was able to 
flex his elbow but was completely paralyzed from the chest down and had no hand 
movement, reported, “[The wheelchair] is not a part of me. It might need to fit me like a pair 
of trousers; it might need to be there when I want it to do what I want to do, but it is not a part 
of me” (Cole, 2004). Conversely, a 27-year-old male patient with a thoracic lesion, complete 
paralysis of the lower half of the body, and spared hand movement and sensation said: “It is a 
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part of me... I forget it” (Papadimitriou 2008). In these two cases, patients with upper and 
lower SCI reported differences in the corporeal experiences with the wheelchair. 
Generally, injury to the upper level of the spinal cord results in greater deficits than injury to 
the lower level. Cervical spine lesions induce legs and trunk paralysis as well as a variable 
degree of sensory loss and partial paralysis of the upper limbs. In contrast, lesions of the 
thoracic and lumbar spine cause paralysis of only the lower limbs. Given the preservation of 
cognitive functions in SCI patients, the mobility-impaired wheelchair-bound patients offer a 
unique opportunity to characterize the inherently plastic nature of the body schema and body 
image as a result of tool use. In particular, sensorimotor deprivation and the specific use of a 
wheelchair may modulate the development of the corporeal awareness of a tool. Since bodily 
representation can change because of temporary (regional anesthesia) (Gimbel, 1975; 
Jauregui-Renaud et al., 2008) or permanent (amputation and peripheral nerve lesions) 
(Murray, 2004; Navarro, 2009) modification of sensorimotor signals, it is logical to expect 
that the proportion of the body that is “isolated” from the brain may have an impact on the 
embodiment of a tool. Along the same lines, the systematic adaptation to an assistive device 
requires a change in the body’s center of mass (Fuentes et al., 2013). Thus, long-lasting 
distortions of the body morphology may reflect a new state of the body image, leading to a 
coherent modification of corporeal awareness. 
 
2.2 Wheelchair actions sound  
 
The functional imbalance of perceptual motor states may be partially restored with active tool 
use (Pereira et al., 1996). A body-held tool, for example, may become essential to the user if it 
facilitates mobility or other essential functions (Serino et al., 2007, Papadimitriou, 2008). As 
previously mentioned, the tool may be processed as a part of one’s own body (Longo and 
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Serino, 2012, Lenggenhager et al., 2013; Farne and Ladavas, 2000) and guide visual-motor 
(Iriki et al., 1996) but also audio-motor (Serino et al., 2007, Bassolino et al., 2010) 
interactions. Each human action produces a characteristic sound that may permit its 
unequivocal recognition. For example, hearing hands clapping may allow an individual to 
draw several inferences about a given event (Aglioti & Pazzaglia, 2010). Similarly, for 
patients with spinal cord injury hearing the sound of a wheelchair approaching may provide 
precise (e.g., specific identity) as well as general (e.g., sex or mood) information about an 
individual. In principle, this patient population may be ideal for testing two fundamental, 
largely unaddressed simulation and embodiment issues: (i) how a relevant extracorporeal tool 
producing a typical sound (e.g. wheelchairs) may affect auditory action representations; and 
(ii) how motor afference/efference may influences the functional integrity of audio-motor 
mapping. 
The notion of embodied cognition postulates that knowledge is grounded on actual bodily 
states and that higher-order processes, such as mind- and intention- reading or action- and 
perception- understanding, can be mapped onto modal sensorimotor cortices (Barsalou, 2008). 
The bodily instantiation of cognitive operations (or “embodiment”) and the perceptual-motor 
state (or “simulation”) are thought to enable the inter-individual sharing of experiences 
(Gallese, 2007). Based on the results of single-cell recordings in monkeys (Gallese et al., 
1996, Fogassi et al., 2005), many neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have 
proposed that the adult human brain is equipped with neural systems and mechanisms that 
affect the perception and execution of actions in a common format (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 
2004, Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009, Hommel et al., 2001, Schutz-Bosbach and Prinz, 
2007). Direct action perception strengthens motor representation (Stefan et al., 2005), and 
short-term motor experiences with a particular action may influence its visual recognition 
(Casile and Giese, 2006) and facilitate action prediction (Pazzaglia, 2013). 
Both visual and auditory channels participate in perception-action coupling (Aglioti and 
 28 
Pazzaglia, 2010). The mechanisms and neural structures involved in the motor coding of 
action-related sounds have been explored in able individuals using correlative and causative 
approaches (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2004, Alaerts et al., 2009, Ticini et al., 2012, Gazzola et al., 
2006, Lahav et al., 2007, De Lucia et al., 2009). These studies indicate that the perception of 
sounds from body part specific actions (e.g. ripping a sheet of paper) activates the left fronto-
parietal network (Aglioti and Pazzaglia, 2011) in a somatotopic arrangement (Gazzola et al., 
2006, Schubotz et al., 2003). Moreover, greater involvement of the left vs. right inferior 
parietal lobe has been reported when an observer’s attention is explicitly directed toward 
action sounds (Lewis et al., 2006). 
The inability to perform or perceive a given motor action may impact on the structural 
integrity of that action representation. Individuals with spinal cord injury (SCI) who are 
unable to move their lower limbs, have a reduced ability to discriminate between different 
observed movements, suggesting that action mapping may be fully determined by immediate 
motor signals (Pernigo et al., 2012, Arrighi et al., 2011). In patients with apraxia, impairment 
in specific actions execution (e.g. inability to clap the hands) greatly reduces the individual’s 
capacity to acoustically recognize the corresponding motor event. However, the inadequate 
discrimination critically depends on a properly functioning left fronto-parietal network 
(Pazzaglia et al., 2008), spared in patients with SCI. Individuals with congenital blindness and 
deafness who have total perceptual loss rely on less implicit motor representations when 
perceiving human actions (Ricciardi et al., 2009, Alaerts et al., 2011, Lewis et al., 2011). 
Blind people, however, may still rely on the coding of aural tool action via simulation, which 
could reflect the activity of inherent motor systems (Ricciardi et al., 2009, Lewis et al., 2011). 
However, it is unclear whether lifelong (mobility by lower limbs) and newly acquired 
(mobility by WHC) perceptual and motor experiences differently impact the integrity of 
action perception mapping. 
 
 29 
2.3 Wheelchair stereotype 
Despite the possibility of independence in most or all activities, individuals with paraplegia 
face multiple challenges that are common to people with disabilities. From rehabilitation tool 
with striking possibilities, the wheelchair may become the symbol of disability and the 
physical marker of the newly acquired bodily condition. The incorporation process described 
above points also to new ways of being in the world, i.e. to the relations between self and 
other and self and world (Winance 2006a, 2006b; Papadimitriou 2008), which extend beyond 
the oppositional distinction able-bodied/disabled. Considering our cultural influences, 
personal experiences, and normative expectations, simply being a wheelchair user is enough 
to be considered an outgroup member and to attract implicit negative stereotyping (Coleman, 
2006). The visibility of a disability (in this case the chair) contributes significantly to 
producing a damaged identity (Goffman,1963). Empirical data are emerging that support the 
importance of the social context for shaping perceptions of quality of life after a spinal cord 
injury (Fuhrer; 1996).  
Although people tend to consider themselves and others as single individuals, there are many 
circumstances in which they think, feel, and act largely as group members. Even if empathy is 
thought to play a critical role in social interactions motivating pro-social behavior (Dovidio et 
al., 1991), people often fail to empathize to the same extent with outgroup members as 
ingroup members (Chiao & Mathur, 2010; Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Stephan & Finlay, 1999). 
The failure of empathy has many practical repercussions for behavior in every day life. In this 
regard, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that people are less likely to help outgroup than 
in-group members in need (Gaertner et al., 1982; Saucer et al., 2005; Kunstman and Plant, 
2008) and less likely to value the lives of outgroup members as much as in-group members 
(Pratto and Glasford, 2008). Furthermore, also response to other’s pain depends on the social 
relationships between the parts. For example, affective links (Singer et al., 2004), perceived 
similarities (Perry et al., 2010), social memberships (Xu et al., 2009) and racial origin 
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(Avenanti et al., 2010) are likely to modulate the level of empathy experienced by the 
observer toward agent’s pain (Chiao and Mathur, 2010, for a review).Failures of empathy are 
especially likely if the sufferer is considered as socially distant. There are specific prejudice-
based attitudes about disability built on social and cultural norms in every society. Recent 
research in social cognition has indicated a way to predict prejudices, grounding on social and 
cultural dimensions (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).  The core assumption behind stigma is that one can infer internal 
worth from an external sign or characteristic. In the case of the wheelchair user the chair 
becomes both the symbol and the object of stigmatization. 
There is also a rapidly growing literature on the relationship between implicit and explicit 
attitudes and the effect of each on behavioral outcomes (Nosek 2005; Nock and Banaji 2007; 
McConnell and Liebold 2001; Greenwald et al., 2009). Concerning the racial bias, the 
evidence suggests that implicit attitudes predict race-related behaviors (Dovidio 2002, 
Towles-Schwen and Fazio, 2006; Rooth; 2010). A recent meta-analysis of attitude-behavior 
linkages (Greenwald et al., 2009) found not only that implicit racial attitudes reliably 
predicted relevant behavioral outcomes, but also that the predictive validity of explicit 
attitudes was compromised in socially sensitive attitude domains. On the contrary other 
authors found that explicit and implicit measures of racial attitudes appear to measure distinct 
concepts.  
Since empathy is such a potent predictor of helping behavior (Decety & Ickes, 2009; Batson, 
et al., 2003), studying its failure as well as its plasticity could be a first stage toward the 
positive promotion of this particular aspect of the pro-social attitude. Although this theme has 
become an important research topic, two essential related matters continue to be largely 
unaddressed. The first concerns the question of whether is there any dissociation in 
explicit/implicit prejudice-based attitudes about disability according to the group-
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membership. The second relates to whether we can actively counteract the presence of 
implicit/explicit bias.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A FUNCTIONALLY RELEVANT TOOL FOR THE BODY 
FOLLOWING SPINAL CORD INJURY 
 
[This research has been published in: Pazzaglia M, Galli G, Scivoletto G, Molinari M (2013) 
A Functionally Relevant Tool for the Body following Spinal Cord Injury. PLoS ONE 
8(3):e58312.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058312] 
 
3.1 Aims and Hypothesis 
A tool that extends or restores movement may become part of the identity of the person to 
whom it belongs. For example, some individuals with spinal cord injury (SCI) adapt their 
body representation to incorporate their wheelchairs. However, it remains unclear how the 
bodily assimilation of a relevant external tool develops as a consequence of altered sensory 
and motor inputs from the body. Generally, injury to the upper level of the spinal cord results 
in greater deficits than injury to the lower level. Given the preservation of cognitive functions 
in SCI patients, the mobility-impaired wheelchair-bound patients offer a unique opportunity 
to characterize the inherently plastic nature of the body schema and body image as a result of 
tool use. In particular, sensorimotor deprivation and the specific use of a wheelchair may 
modulate the development of the corporeal awareness of the tool. It is logical to expect that 
the proportion of the body that is “isolated” from the brain may have an impact on the 
embodiment of a tool. Along the same lines, the systematic adaptation to an assistive device 
requires a change in the body’s center of mass (Fuentes et al., 2013). Thus, long-lasting 
distortions of the body morphology may reflect a new state of the body image, leading to a 
coherent modification of corporeal awareness. To explore such relationships in this study, we 
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collected structured reports on the introspective experiences of regular wheelchair use in 
patients with SCI. Our aim was to determine, after SCI at different levels, how the degree of 
spared sensorimotor function or the prolonged confinement by sitting in a wheelchair 
modulates the introspective experiences of instantiation of a wheelchair as captured by a 
standard principal component analysis (PCA). 
 
3.2 Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-five wheelchair-bound patients were recruited from the Santa Lucia Hospital in Rome, 
where they were undergoing treatment in the Spinal Cord Rehabilitation Unit. All patients 
navigated autonomously in their wheelchair, using their arms for control. Three patients with 
complete cervical injuries (patients 1, 2, and 17) operated an electronic wheelchair. The 
remaining 52 patients propelled a wheelchair manually. The patients utilized their wheelchairs 
for approximately 13 h/day. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. The 
study protocol was approved by the local ethics committee (IRCCS Ethics Committee at 
Fondazione Santa Lucia, Rome) in accordance with the ethical standards of the Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
Assessment of individuals with SCI 
The SCI lesions ranged from C3 to L1, as shown in Figure 1. Lesions were at 92.2 ± 84.6 
months post-SCI (range: 6.2 to 340.6 months), which is within the chronic injury phase. None 
of the patients had experienced head or brain lesions associated with their SCI, as documented 
by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). A neurologist (G.S.) examined each patient after 
admission to the study. The international standards of the American Spinal Injury Association 
(ASIA) for the classification of SCI were used to document the sensory and motor 
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impairments following SCI (Marino et al., 2003). The third version of the Spinal Cord 
Independence Measure (SCIM III) was used to quantify the functional status of each patient 
(Catz et al., 1997; Anderson et al., 2011). For the purposes of this study, the Self-care and 
Mobility subscales were used. The Self-care subscale consists of six items with scores ranging 
from 0 to 20. The Management and Mobility subscale consists of nine items with scores 
ranging from 0 to 40. Grades of 0 to 8 (requiring higher ability) are assigned for each item 
according to increasing difficulty. The neurological and clinical data are presented in 
Appendix A, Table 3.1. 
 
The relationship between injury location and functional disorder 
After spinal cord injury, the body parts located below the point of the lesion are insentient and 
unmoving. The various degrees of sensory and motor impairment are expressed mainly by 
neurological status, which is determined by the level and severity of the damage to the spinal 
cord. 
Accordingly, the spinal cord vertebrae were numbered from the top, beginning at the neck and 
extending downward through the back. Lower numbers indicate upper cervical vertebrae 
(Figure 3.1). The lesion level was converted to a numerical value of the corresponding 
numbered vertebral column level. The neurological status determines the number of body 
segments that are “isolated” from the brain and the functional activity or potential ability. 
Indeed, significant positive correlations were observed between the lesion level and the Self-
care subscale scores (Spearman r(53) = 0.68, t = 6.71, p < 0.0001) and Management and 
Mobility subscale scores (Spearman r(53) = 0.59, t = 5.30, p < 0.0003), indicating a direct 
relationship between the level at which the spinal cord lesion occurred and the degree of body 
functional capacity. Although the patients with upper spinal cord lesions included in our study 
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retained partial upper-body function, injury in the upward-extending region of the spinal cord 
reflects a higher degree of sensory loss and partial paralysis, which consequently modulates 
the overall ability to act in a wheelchair.  
  
Figure 3.1 Relationship between the nerve level of the SCI and movement. Among all patients with SCI 
recruited for this study, the level of lesions ranged from C3 to L1, as highlighted in the figure. 
 
Questionnaire 
Using a rating scale ranging from 0 (“completely disagree”) to 7 (“completely agree”), 
participants evaluated questions designed to capture the implicit and explicit tool and body 
experiences. The questions, including previously adapted hypothesized constructs with 
prosthetic devices (Murray, 2004), were selected on the basis of a previous analysis of the 
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transcripts from informal interviews with 13 patients with SCI who reported wheelchair-
related feelings (unpublished). Six of the questions concerned the implicit (items BI1–BI6), 
and five questions explored the explicit (items BE1–BE5) bodily experiences of wheelchair 
use. The following questions translated from Italian were investigated: 
[BI1] Diet: Do you follow a controlled diet to prevent changes to your body shape and to 
avoid problems with the wheelchair? 
[BI2] Maintenance: Do you think of ways to prevent problems with the wheelchair? That is, 
do you pay particular attention to its maintenance? 
[BI3] Defense: Do you protect your wheelchair from dangerous situations? 
[BI4] Awareness: Did you experience any change in your attention and/or awareness while 
being in a wheelchair (after 1, 3, and 6 months)? 
[BI5] Tool: Do you perceive the wheelchair as an external tool? 
[BI6] Affect: Do you feel emotionally attached to your wheelchair? 
[BE1] Entire body: Do you perceive the wheelchair as part of your entire body? 
[BE2] Lower limbs: Do you perceive the wheelchair only as part of your lower limbs? 
[BE3] Substitution: Do you perceive the wheelchair as a “substitute” for your body? 
[BE4] Extension: Do you perceive the wheelchair as an “extension” of your body? 
[BE5] Action: Do you perceive the wheelchair as a form of compensation for your actions? 
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Having defined implicit and explicit body experiences with the wheelchair, we next 
specifically targeted the presence or absence of corporeal awareness of the wheelchair by 
using the following two questions: 
[BI] Image: Close your eyes and imagine yourself [pause for 3 s]. Do you see the wheelchair? 
[BE] Frame: When thinking about your body frame, do you feel that the wheelchair is an 
internal part of your body? 
 
Statistical analyses 
Wheelchair embodiment among SCI patients was determined based on 11 different 
questionnaire statements. A PCA with an orthogonal varimax rotation was conducted to 
reduce the dimensionality of the data by computing new variables called principal 
components, which were obtained as linear combinations of the original items. 
Certain indicators are traditionally used to draw conclusions regarding the appropriateness of 
a PCA. The strength of the linear relationship between items has been represented by a 
correlation coefficient greater than 0.3 (Hair, 1998). Although the ratio of patients to items 
was 5:1, as recommended (Bryant & Yarnold, 1995; Gorsuch, 1983; MacCallum, 1999; 
Everitt, 1975; Arrindell & Van der Ende, 1985), we also used the Kayser–Meyer–Olkin 
(KMO) measure to test the adequacy of the sample and the Bartlett test of sphericity to verify 
the extent of correlation allowable between items. Scree plots and eigenvalues greater than 1 
were used to determine the appropriate number of components. Only items that loaded 
strongly (above 0.5) were considered, in accordance with the standard PCA approach (Jolliffe, 
2002) and psychometric evaluations of embodiment (Longo et al., 2008). 
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Briefly, the different steps involved in a PCA include the calculation of the correlation matrix, 
the extraction of the initial principal components, the application of the varimax rotation, the 
calculation of factor scores assigned to components, and the generation of factor loadings 
weighted for each component extracted. On each principal component axis, we also computed 
a single score to which all normalized measurements contributed for each patient. 
We then analyzed the factor scores addressed in the PCA using a multiple regression analysis 
to explore the embodiment facets that are related to the clinical data (i.e., lesion level or 
exposure to/experience with the wheelchair).  
 
3.3 Results 
We will first report a brief summary of the results obtained for each question regarding the 
presence or absence of a corporeal attribution of the wheelchair. Among the 55 participants, 
67% experienced the feeling that the wheelchair was integrated with their body [BE question], 
and 72% viewed the wheelchair in their corporeal image [question BI]. The percentage of 
responses indicating the presence of the wheelchair within the boundaries of the physical 
body in answer to at least one of the two questions described above (BE and BI) was higher 
than the percentage of responses indicating its absence (binomial test, p < 0.04). These 
percentages of wheelchair assimilation served as a “phenomenon check.” We then analyzed 
the questionnaire statements using the PCA (Figure 3.2). 
With the exception of two items (BE4 and BI4) all other correlations were significant at the 
5% level and entered in the PCA analysis. The KMO test yielded values (KMO = 0.68) above 
the acceptable limit of 0.5 (Field, 2011). Moreover, Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that 
correlations between items were large enough for the PCA χ2(36) = 119; p < .0001). Analyses 
of eigenvalues and scree plot converged in the extraction of three components that, together, 
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accounted for 66.3% of the variance. Figure 3.2 shows the statement scores for each of the 
three principal components. The means and standard deviations and communalities for the 
statement scores are given in Appendix A, Table 3.2. 
 
Principal component 1 accounted for substantially more variance than the other two 
components (variance = 31.01%; eigenvalue = 2.8) and included items BI5, BI6, BE2, BE3, 
and BE5, which exhibited the highest loadings (magnitude of 0.5 or more). A major difference 
was observed in the positive loadings for “action,” “lower limb,” “substitution,” and “affect” 
and in the negative loadings for “tool,” suggesting that two separate processes load on the first 
component. The wheelchair appeared to be processed as if it were a part of the patients’ limbs 
as opposed to a tool that reflects a more substitutive process linked to actions. This is 
consistent with the concept of functional embodiment. Although the positive loading for 
“affect” may seem to be a functionally less relevant point, this may partly explain the 
association between the level of wheelchair use and satisfaction of patients with their tool.  
Principal component 2 (variance = 20.6 %; eigenvalue = 1.85) included items BI1, BI2, and 
BI3, which captured the burden of assistive tool care. The new corporeal state leads to the 
management of body weight, and the safety, risks, and dangers that redefine the person in 
terms of “body plus wheelchair” gain more focus.  
Principal component 3 (variance = 14.4%; eigenvalue = 1.3) included items BI5 and BE1. 
These statements are related to the perception of the wheelchair as a body part (positive 
loading) as opposed to a tool (negative loading). Item BI6 loaded moderately (0.40) on the 
component 3 providing convergent evidence that a lower emotional attachment to the 
wheelchair selectively influences the sense of embodiment of the tool. 
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Figure 3.2 Loadings of the statements on the three principal components extracted. The labels on the x-axis 
refer to the statements shown in panel A. Black bars indicate the statements with the highest loadings (≥ 0.5) for 
each component. A. Statements used to assess wheelchair embodiment. 
 
We also computed the 55 individual component scores, using a single composite measure 
created for each patient on each orthogonal dimension. A factor score represents a 
participant’s standard score on each specific component. 
To identify the potential predictors of the three components, we investigated the relationship 
between the factor scores of each component and the clinical data: the lesion level, the time 
since the lesion, and exposure to (daily hours) and experience (time since use) with the 
wheelchair. The multiple linear regression analysis revealed that a lower lesion level predicted 
a larger value for principal component 1 (β = 0.48, F(4,50) = 4.4, p = 0.004). Lesion level was 
not a significant predictor of components 2 (β = 0.19, F(4,50) = 1.01, p = 0.40) or 3 (β = −0.06, 
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F(4,50) = 0.95, p = 0.44). Among all SCI patients, neither the time since injury nor exposure 
to/experience with the wheelchair predicted the individual component scores for each of the 
three principal components (β = n.s. for all). The model indicated that having a lower lesion 
enhanced the positive factor (limb, action, and substitution) linked to the functional aspect of 
the embodiment. However, this relation was reversed for the tool factor, which exhibited a 
negative score. This linear relationship suggests that the feeling of functional embodiment 
regarding the wheelchair should be substantially enhanced in relation to active body 
segments.  
The sensory-motor control of a wheelchair imposes considerable demand on the upper 
extremities. In particular, a precise balance occurs between the full use of the upper limbs and 
the strength or endurance of the trunk muscles to guarantee stability (Kulig et al., 2001).  
All SCI patients in the study had complete paralysis of the legs but had various degrees of 
upper body impairment, such as hand/arm and trunk deficits. To more fully determine the 
demands on the specific upper body segment, we categorized patients with complete (grade 
A) injuries into tetraplegia (T: C3–C7), high paraplegia (PH: T2–T7), and low paraplegia (PL: 
T8–L1) groups. The first group included patients with extensive deficits in the entire body (in 
the arms as well as the trunk). The second group included patients with full use of hands/arms 
but limited strength, balance, and use of the trunk. The last group comprised patients who had 
more full use of the upper body (arms and trunk). 
A mixed-model ANOVA with significant items in principal component 1 (BI5, BI6, BE2, BE3, 
and BE5) × group (high-paraplegia, low-paraplegia and tetraplegia) revealed a significant 
effect for the items type (F(4,164) = 6.7; p < 0.001) which was explained by the higher ratings 
for BE5 (p < 0.01 for all) compared with the other items (BI5, BI6, BE2, BE3). No significant 
differences were observed between groups (F(2,41)= 2.14; p = .13). 
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However, we did observe a significant group × item interaction (F(8,164) = 2.8; p < 0.006). 
Fisher’s post-hoc test revealed that individuals with low and high paraplegia had a 
significantly higher rating when perceiving their wheelchair as part of their lower limbs (PL = 
4.41 and PH = 4.11) than those with tetraplegia (T = 2; p < 0.04 for all). Interestingly, patients 
with tetraplegia tended to regard the wheelchair more as an external device (T = 4.7) 
compared with individuals with low paraplegia (PL =2.6; p < 0.01) but not compared with 
those with high paraplegia (PH = 3.2; p > 0.11). Patients with low paraplegia (PL =5.94; p < 
0.04) tended to regard the wheelchair more as a compensation for their actions compared with 
individuals with tetraplegia (T = 4.3) but not with those with high paraplegia (PH = 5.5; p > 
0.68); the two latter groups did not differ from one another (p > 0.21). Upper extremity 
interaction with the wheelchair enhances the feeling of embodiment. The trunk, which 
functions to maintain posture and partially govern wheelchair movement, appears to modulate 
the flexibility in the integration of the tool. 
We observed no relevant effects of the other statements (affect and substitution), which 
indicates that the three groups considered these aspects of the embodiment experience with a 
wheelchair in a similar way, despite their different lesions and body capacities (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3 Functional aspect of the sense of embodiment concerning the wheelchair. The mean subjective 
ratings for the statements with the highest loadings in Component 1 in the three subject groups with complete 
injuries (tetraplegia, high paraplegia and lower paraplegia). The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean 
(SEM). The asterisks (*) indicate significant results from the post hoc comparisons (p < .05). 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Most patients with SCI perceive that their legs are still their own (Lenggenhager et al., 2012), 
despite their inability to use or feel them (Cole, 2004). Although the patients do not confuse 
their body parts with their wheelchair (Nizzi et al., 2012), some do consider themselves to be 
“individuals with a wheelchair,” whereas others regard themselves as “enwheeled 
individuals” (Papadimitriou, 2008; Cole, 2004). This identity or “wholeness” discrepancy 
prompted us to investigate whether the somatomotor deafferentation/deefferentation of 
disconnected body segments and the exposure to/experience with the tool, affects corporeal 
awareness of the wheelchair. To explore the presence of any such relationships, we developed 
a novel questionnaire regarding wheelchair-related feelings. 
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Among all participants included in the present study, a significant number experienced the 
wheelchair as being internal to the corporeal boundary, suggesting a revision in their body 
image. The perception of the body’s edges does not appear to be fixed; rather, the body is 
plastic and flexible to assimilate the tool. As captured by component 1, the corporeal 
awareness of the tool emerges not merely as an extension of the body but as a substitute for 
(and part of) the functional self. This assistive device offers the possibility, at least in 
principle, to partially “repair” the motor functionality of the damaged body part (Murray 
2004; Pereira et al., 1996) and appears conceived not as an object to move but as a mediator 
of the limbs’ action. This reorganization of body model is consistent with the positive 
inclusion of the wheelchair to accommodate physical impairment and restore mobility 
(Papadimitriou, 2008; Standal, 2011; Arnhoff & Mehl, 1963; Higuchi et al., 2004, Higuchi et 
al., 2009; Merleau-Ponty, 2002). The perceived bodily experience is that of being functionally 
whole, and the system reorganizes itself to achieve its original balance, which enables the 
immobile user to act in the world. Amputees who use prostheses, which are less efficient and 
less safe than a wheelchair, report that the object became “part of them,” and they feel as 
though they have a normal, complete body (Murray, 2004; Andre et al., 2001). Importantly, 
the emotional and physical acceptance of and adaptation to the wheelchair occurs over a 
period of years (Avillion, 1986; Bates et al., 1993). It also appears to affect the new corporal 
state whereby the tool feels like “part of” the user. The wheelchair requires the regulation of 
weight and a great deal of effort and control (maintenance and defense) to achieve reliable 
usage. The burden of assistive tool care appears to be indirectly processed considering the 
safety, risks, and danger to the body.  
Given the prolonged history of immobility, the bodily attribution may refer to confinement in 
the wheelchair. However, no effects of either exposure to or experience with the wheelchair 
on the embodiment of this tool were observed. In contrast, we found that chronic 
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sensorimotor loss specifically predicted the individual’s corporeal awareness of his/her 
wheelchair. 
A more unconscious body model, the body schema, which enables motor control and reflects 
the proprioceptive, tactile inputs of how the body is “felt”, may regulate the functional aspects 
of embodiment considerably. Indeed, the compensatory flexibility of wheelchair embodiment 
observed in patients with SCI is linearly linked to their ability to feel and move the superior 
extremities, the trunk and arms in particular.  
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the embodiment of an object is modulated by tactile 
interaction (Ehrsson et al., 2005), and objects that have been in contact with the body (Aglioti 
et al., 1996; Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997) and are actively used (Bassolino et al., 2010) become 
part of the bodily representation (Longo & Serino 2012; Bassolino et al., 2010). The online 
information regarding movement in a wheelchair is a prerequisite for the capacity to feel that 
the event is generated by one’s own body and one has control over it. The different modes of 
wheelchair use (from placing the hands on the wheels to steering a knob in more severe cases) 
may reflect a different attribution or evaluation of being the author of the movement, affecting 
how the retrospective sense of agency is perceived. This prediction might be tested in future 
research by comparing patients with SCI who operate their wheelchair manually with those 
who operate it electronically.  
In the case of an upper spinal cord lesion, much more than in the case of a lower spinal cord 
lesion, there is a more pronounced reduction of strength and functionality in the entire body as 
well as an overall lack of feeling of touch. Such impairment interferes with the feeling of the 
wheelchair in direct contact with the body and with other objects and mainly with the regular 
status that updates the enwheeled body in motion. This failure to “capture” the somatic, 
proprioceptive, and motor information continuously being exchanged with the “body plus 
wheelchair” hinders the processes that are essential for creating an abstract reference of the 
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body frame (Gandevia & Phegan, 1999; Paqueron et al., 2003), leading to the feeling of the 
wheelchair as a corporeal assimilation. This concept is in line with the particular aberration of 
corporeal detachment and distance observed in patients with higher SCI (Lenggenhager et al., 
2012) as well as in individuals with locked-in syndrome (Nizzi et al., 2012). 
Neuroanatomically, such distorted sensorimotor input presumably induces adaptive or 
maladaptive cortical reorganization (Kokotilo et al., 2009). After SCI, the loss of 
afferent/efferent information related to the body parts located below the lesion leads to the 
structural and functional reorganization of the cortex, particularly in somatomotor areas 
(Freund et al., 2011a; Freund et al., 2011b; Henderson et al., 2011), and affects complex 
intracortical connections (Kokotilo et al., 2009; Freund et al., 2011b; Freund et al., 2012). 
Decreased frontal and frontoparietal cortical connectivity by the alteration of ascending and 
descending neural information flow is most pronounced in individuals with upper SCI 
(Truccolo et al., 2008). Conversely, in patients with lower SCI, an expansion of the primary 
somatosensory and motor-cortex hand area into the output-deprived primary-cortex leg area 
was observed (Curt et al., 2002; Henderson et al., 2011), which translates into a functional 
gain for the internal sensorimotor body representation (Kokotilo et al., 2009). 
Moreover, atypical connectivity plays a prominent role in neuronal activity within the parietal 
cortex, which is the dominant structure for bodily representation (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). 
Indeed, recent clinical and neuroimaging data suggest that temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 
activity reflects the multisensory integration of bodily instantiation (Arzy et al., 2006) as well 
as feelings of spatial unity related to the body (Blanke & Arzy, 2005). Moreover, the TPJ is 
thought to rely on the combination of tactile and proprioceptive information in a coordinated 
reference frame (Blanke et al., 2004; Lenggenhager et al., 2006). Dysfunction in this area may 
lead to a modified body experience, which is felt to be spatially disconnected (Blanke, 2012). 
Nevertheless, without further data, we cannot discern whether the modulation of embodiment 
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results from effects on brain networks, the periphery, or both. This should be investigated in 
future studies, for example, by investigating changes of the BOLD signal in brain areas of 
bodily representation in both injured and healthy subjects using paradigms eliciting self-
referential activity during the observation of an avatar engaged in dynamic actions with tools. 
One potential study limitation was the use of introspective data and PCA, which, although an 
elegant and powerful tool (Longo et al., 2008), needs to include empirical measures. 
Therefore, we aimed to establish the effect of sensorimotor loss, and the specific use of this 
tool, on wheelchair embodiment. It is important to note that previous SCI studies have already 
demonstrated the physical adjustment to (Fuentes et al., 2013; Arnhoff & Mehl, 1963; 
Higuchi et al., 2006; Higuchi et al., 2009), and brain representation of (Olsson, 2012), the 
“body plus wheelchair” being perceived as one. We also capitalized on the fact that 12 of the 
patients recruited for this study were tested in a separate experiment that indicated patients 
with SCI embody functionally relevant wheelchair action sounds (unpublished data, presented 
in Galli et al., Concepts, Actions, and Objects; Functional and Neural Prospective Meeting 
Abstract, 2012).  
Altogether, our data suggest that the subjective experience of the embodiment of an external 
tool in patients with SCI is a complex, multifarious process that requires the following: a 
feeling of ownership over the tool (including a long-lasting coherent and accurate 
representation); online multisensory integration, referenced on the state of the body (including 
the effective regulation of sensorimotor information flow); and, finally the self-attributed 
control of the physical body and its movement. 
The phenomenal reports from SCI individuals cannot be generalized to all occurrences of 
corporeal awareness of a tool but offer an initial step towards the determination of clearly 
dissociable subcomponents of prosthetic device embodiment. Indeed, the objective and 
quantitative evaluation of changes in patients with spinal cord lesions help identify the cause 
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that may preclude the experience of self-attribution and embodiment of a tool. United 
harmony between the body and the tool may be key for the embodied experience of success or 
rejection of an assistive device. Embodying a wheelchair may enhance the efficiency and 
safety of movement, thereby reducing bodily effort and the damage produced by its use. This 
ease of use may lead to greater autonomy and self-organization, thus allowing patients to 
benefit from the opportunities offered by the environment in which they move. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMBODYING FUNCTIONALLY RELEVANT ACTION SOUNDS IN 
PATIENTS WITH SPINAL CORD INJURY 
 
[This research has been submitted in: Pazzaglia M, Scivoletto G, Galli G, Lewis JW, Molinari 
M, Aglioti SM. Embodying functionally relevant action sounds in patients with spinal cord 
injury. Cortex.] 
 
4.1 Aims and Hypothesis 
Growing evidence indicates that perceptual-motor codes may be associated with and 
influenced by actual bodily states. The inability to perform or perceive a given motor action 
may impact on the structural integrity of that action representation. In the visual domain, 
individuals with spinal cord injury (SCI) who are unable to move their lower limbs, have a 
reduced ability to discriminate between different observed movements, suggesting that action 
mapping may be fully determined by immediate motor signals (Pernigo et al., 2012, Arrighi et 
al., 2011). However, a dearth of direct evidence exists about whether profound alterations in 
sensorimotor traffic between the body and brain influence audio-motor representations. In 
principle, this patient population may be ideal for testing two fundamental, largely 
unaddressed simulation and embodiment issues: (i) how motor afference/efference influences 
the functional integrity of audio-motor mapping; and (ii) how relevant extracorporeal tools 
(e.g. wheelchairs) affect action representations. We hypothesize that the perceptual and motor 
experiences induced by the sounds of a wheelchair and lower limb activity should differ 
substantially between subjects with different levels of exposure to wheelchair- and limb-
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related sounds. To test this hypothesis, we examined audio-motor mapping in three groups of 
participant. Wheelchair-bound patients with SCI have extensive motor and auditory 
experience of wheelchair sounds, but do not have motor use of their legs. Physical therapists 
with normal limb function have extensive perceptual experience of wheelchairs, but are not 
personally dependent on them. The third group consisted of able-bodied controls who had no 
previous experience of wheelchairs. We devised a novel psychophysical task that evaluated 
the auditory discrimination ability of sounds originating from actions produced by wheelchair 
use, the upper and lower limb, and animals. Listening to sounds of various actions performed 
by a tool or lower limbs allowed us to dissociate the perceptual and motor contributions of 
biological or artificial mobility entities (De Lucia et al., 2009). Furthermore, the given task 
allowed us to investigate the inverse relationship between movements that the patients had 
previously possessed, lost, and then regained with wheelchair use.  
 
4.2 Materials and Methods 
Participants 
At the Santa Lucia Hospital in Rome, Italy, we recruited 14 subjects with established lumbar 
or thoracic SCI (12 men; mean age, 38.6 years; range, 19–56 years), 15 able-bodied 
participants who had worked exclusively with SCI patients as physical therapists (nine men; 
mean age, 40 years; range, 27–54 years), and 15 able-bodied subjects who were not physical 
therapists (eight men; mean age, 38.1 years; range, 20–66 years). The three groups did not 
differ in age and level of education (p > .23). The physical therapists were employed full-time 
and had an average of five years experience in SCI patient rehabilitation (range, 1–25 years). 
All of the subjects were right-handed, as determined by the 10-item version of the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Written, informed consent was obtained from each 
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participant for all procedures, and the local ethics committee of Santa Lucia Hospital, Rome, 
approved the study. 
 
Assessment of individuals with SCI  
All of the patients had a traumatic lesion at the thoracic or lumbar level of the spinal cord that 
caused paralysis of the lower limbs while sparing upper limb function. Lesions were located 
between T3 and L1, and the patients ranged from 6.3 to 219 months post-SCI (mean, 65 ± 75 
months). Each patient was examined by a neurologist (G.S.) with specific, long-standing 
expertise in treating SCI patients. The neurological injury level was determined using the 
American Spinal Injury Association (ASIA) for the classification of SCIs (Marino et al., 
2003). A standardized ASIA examination protocol was used to determine the most caudal 
level of the spinal cord with normal sensory and motor functions on both sides of the body. 
Functional ability was quantified using the third version of the Spinal Cord Independence 
Measure (SCIM III) (Catz and Itzkovich, 2007). For the purposes of the experiment, the Self-
care and the Management and Mobility subscales were considered. All patients were manual 
wheelchair users and recruited from physiotherapy programs of Spinal Cord Unit. None of the 
patients had experienced head or brain lesions, as documented by an MRI. No patient 
presented auditory discrimination deficits or signs of psychiatric disorders, and none of the 
patients had a history of substance abuse. The demographic and additional clinical data of the 
patients are presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Clinical and demographic data of the spinal cord injury patients. The clinical neurological level 
of the lesion (T, thoracic; L, lumbar) was reported for the subjects with spinal cord injury (SCI). The 
neurological and functional levels of the injury were determined using the American Impairment Scale (AIS) and 
the third version of the Spinal Cord Independence Measure (SCIM III). The motor/sensory level indicates the 
most caudal segment of the spinal cord with normal motor/sensory function. 
 
Sound-into-action translation test  
Because the auditory system is an intact sensory channel to individuals with paraplegia, we 
used a sound-into-action translation task to explore the effects of a massive loss of motor 
function in the lower extremities on the ability to distinguish between different action-sounds. 
In a two-choice, matching-to-sample auditory action discrimination task, the participants were 
asked to determine which of two probe sounds matched the previously heard single sample 
sound (for a schematic representation see Figure 4.1). The sounds used included upper (URAS) 
and lower (LRAS) limb-related action sounds, wheelchair-related action sounds (WRAS), and 
animal action-related sounds (AARS). 
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 Figure 4.1 Action sound discrimination task. In each trial, following the presentation of a sample sound, two 
subsequent probe sounds were presented. Only one of the two probe sounds was specifically related to the 
sample sound. In the set of lower limb actions (e.g. “male footsteps on a glass surface” [the sample sound]), one 
probe sound represented the same action as the sample sound but was produced using a different source (e.g. 
“female footsteps on a wood surface”), whereas the other probe sound represented a totally different action 
produced using the same body part (e.g. “running”). No image associated with an aural action was provided. 
 
Stimuli and task 
The auditory stimuli (44.1 kHz, 16 bit, and monophonic) included 120 real-world sounds 
compiled by a sound engineer using professional collections (Sound Cinecittà, Rome, Italy, 
and Sound Ideas, Richmond Hill, Ontario, Canada). Many of these sounds were identical to 
those used in our previous studies (Pazzaglia et al., 2008, Lewis et al., 2011). The sounds 
were trimmed to an average duration of 4sec (range, 3–6.5 s) and presented to the participants 
at a comfortable decibel level through Sennheiser PC165 earphones, using the Presentation 
software (version 12.2, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.) on a Windows operating system. 	  
Each sound belonged to one of the following four categories: 
(1) Upper limb actions: a group of 10 sets of three different sounds. In this category, the 
sample, the matching and the non-matching stimuli were sounds of meaningful actions 
executed by the hands  (e.g. knocking on a door). 
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 (2) Lower limb actions: a group of 10 sets of three different sounds. In this category, the 
stimuli were three sounds of meaningful actions executed by the feet (e.g. descending 
footsteps on stairs).  
(3) Wheelchair actions: a group of 10 sets of three different sounds. In this category, the 
stimuli were sounds of meaningful actions executed by manual (WHCM) or electronic 
(WHCE) wheelchair actions (e.g. WHC braking) and manual/electrical vehicle motion (e.g. 
bicycle).  
(4) Non-human animal actions: a group of 10 sets of three sounds related to animal physical 
actions, excluding vocalizations (e.g. a bird flying). 
A list of the auditory stimuli and information on the preliminary psychophysical studies are 
provided in Appendix A, Table 4.2. 
Procedures 
Each participant was tested in a single experimental session that lasted approximately 20 
minutes. During this period, the subjects wore earphones and sat approximately 50 cm from a 
17-inch computer monitor. Each trial was initiated by the presentation of a sample action 
sound that was selected randomly from one of the four categories (i.e. URAS, LRAS, WRAS or 
AARS). At the end of the sample sound presentation, two subsequent matching and non-
matching action-sound stimuli were presented in quick succession, separated by an 
approximate interval of 100 msec. The matching action-sound represented the same motor act 
as the sample, but with different acoustic features. The non-matching action-sound was 
acoustically similar to the sample, but linked to a different action within the same category. 
The sequence of matching and non-matching sound stimuli was counter balanced. For 
example in the URAS category, a brief sample sound of an individual clapping three times was 
presented, after which the subjects listened to two additional sounds, one of which 
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represented the same action as the sample sound, but was produced using a different source 
(e.g. group applause) and the other sound represented a completely different action produced 
by using the same body part, which was acoustically similar (e.g. knocking on a door three 
times).  
The subjects were asked to choose between the two auditory stimuli to identify the sound that 
evoked the same action heard in the sample sound. To better discriminate among the three 
different sounds, the words “action sound” (for the sample sound) and the numerals 1 (for the 
first probe sound) and 2 (for the second probe sound) appeared on the black screen while each 
respective sound was played. No image associated with an aural action was provided. After 
all three sounds were presented, the final screen prompted the subject to choose a response by 
pressing a button. The participants were instructed to answer as accurately and quickly as 
possible, and their accuracy and response times after the prompt (i.e. latency) were recorded 
and analyzed. Before beginning the test, the participants were given four practice trials, after 
which performance feedback was provided. The practice auditory stimuli differed from those 
used in the experimental phase, after which no feedback was provided.  
To evaluate the subjective rating of each sound category, a post-test session was conducted, in 
which the same participants were instructed to rank each sound in terms of familiarity and 
perceived motor intensity on a vertical 10-cm visual analog scale (VAS). The first question 
was intended to assess their experience with each sound category (“How familiar is this sound 
to you?”), while the second investigated a subject’s experience with the amount of movement 
sensations triggered by each sound (“To what degree do you feel your own movement is 
based on the action you have just heard?”). With regard to the first question, the lower and 
upper extremes of the VAS were “no familiarity” and “high familiarity,” respectively, 
whereas for the second question, these extremes indicated “no perceived movement” and 
“maximum perceived movement,” respectively. The participants were explicitly asked to rate 
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the sounds, which were presented randomly, in a counterbalanced order. Finally, we collected 
structured reports on the implicit and explicit introspective experiences of regular wheelchair 
use in patients with SCI. 
 
Data analyses 
The accuracy (raw data) and mean latency were calculated for each participant in each 
experimental condition (10 trials per category). Trials in which the reaction times (RTs) were 
two or more standard deviations above the mean for each subject were eliminated prior to the 
analysis (2% of the trials) (Ratcliff, 1993). Half of the eliminated trials were associated with 
URAS actions. Only the RTs for the correct response were considered. The individual 
accuracy, mean latency values and subjective ratings were entered into separate mixed-model 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with group (healthy subjects, patients with SCI, and 
physical therapists) as the between-subjects factor and sound category (URAS, LRAS, WRAS, and 
AARS) as the within-subjects factor. All pair-wise comparisons were performed using the 
Duncan post hoc test. The partial eta-squared (ηp2) measure of variance was selected as the 
index of effect size (Cohen, 1973). A significance threshold of p < .05 was set for all of the 
statistical analyses. The data are reported as mean ± standard error of the mean (SEM). 
 
4.3 Results 
Patients with SCI 
Sound discrimination performance in patients with SCI was > 80% for all conditions. The 
ANOVA of accuracy revealed a significant main effect of sound category (F3,123 = 7.60, P < 
.001, ηp2 > .19), which was explained by the reduced accuracy observed in the LRAS condition 
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(8 correct trials) compared with the URAS (8.5 correct trials), WRAS (8.8 correct trials), and 
AARS (8.5 correct trials) conditions (all p < .04). No significant effects of group (F2,41 = .51, p 
= .59) and no group × sound category interactions (F6,123 = 1.15, p = .34) were observed, 
indicating that the three groups had comparable performance in the four different sound 
categories. 
 The ANOVA of latency (Figure 4.2) revealed no significant main effects of group (F2,41 = 
058, p = .56) or sound category (F3,123 = .63, p = .59) but a significant group × sound category 
interaction (F6,123 = 2.7, p = .02, ηp2 > .17).  
Importantly, the post hoc comparisons revealed that the patients with SCI discriminated the 
WRAS earlier (608 ms) than the able-bodied individuals with comparable auditory experience 
(physical therapists: 706 ms, p < .04) and those with no comparable perceptual experience 
(healthy subjects: 814 ms, p < .0001). The latency difference in RTs between the physical 
therapists and healthy subjects was also statistically significant (p < .04). Notably, in patients 
with SCI, the RTs for WRAS were comparable to the RTs elicited by upper and lower limb 
action sounds (LRAS = 716.0 ms, URAS = 708.1 ms). Regular wheelchair use contributed to a 
specific and significant readiness to recognize the sounds produced by a wheelchair. Latency 
improvements were not accompanied by changes in accuracy, thereby ruling out potential 
speed/accuracy trade-off effects. 
Importantly, SCI patient performance was similar for sounds related to actions of the lower 
(LRAS = 716.0 ms) and upper (URAS = 708.1ms) limbs (p = .87), suggesting that audio-motor 
mapping can be retained even when the effector limb is no longer functional. 
No significant latency differences were observed between the lower and upper limb sounds in 
any of the three groups: healthy subjects (LRAS = 711.4 ms, URAS = 727.3 ms), physical 
therapists (LRAS = 662.9 ms, URAS = 761.8 ms), and patients with SCI (LRAS = 716.0 ms, URAS 
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= 708.1 ms; all p > .30). There were also no differences between the three groups with regard 
to their responses to animal body action sounds (p > .24). Moreover, no differences were 
observed in discrimination latency between the WHCM and WHCE sounds or with regard to 
the order of the presentation of the correct probe (all p > .80). 
We also examined whether the time since the injury influenced RTs for sound discrimination. 
No significant correlations were found between the SCI lesion-testing interval and latency in 
the discrimination of each sound category (Spearman correlation analyses; LRAS, r14 = -0.16, 
t12 = -.57, p < .58; URAS, r14 = -.27, t12 = -.99, p < .33; WRAS, r14 = -.01, t12 = -.05, p < .95). All 
patients were in the chronic injury phase (at least six months post-injury), and the time since 
injury did not appear to play a major role in sound discrimination related to wheelchair action, 
suggesting that plastic changes could occur rapidly and lead to behavioral gain. 
 
Figure 4.2 Latency in action-sound discrimination. The mean latency for each sound category (upper (URAS) 
and lower (LRAS) limb-related action sounds, wheelchair-related action sounds (WRAS), and animal action-related 
sounds (AARS)) in the three subject groups (healthy individuals, physical therapists and individuals with spinal 
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cord injuries). The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM). The asterisk (*) indicates significant 
results from the post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05).	   
 
Because three of the patients with SCI included in our study had incomplete injuries, we 
performed additional analyses that only considered the performance of patients with complete 
lesions. Consistent with the results of the original analysis of the entire sample, the ANOVA 
revealed a significant group × sound category interaction (F6,114 = 2.24, p < .04). 
The ANOVA confirmed that in the patients with SCI there were no differences in the mean 
latencies for the different human action sounds (LRAS = 661 ms, URAS = 640 ms; all p > .10) 
and the faster discrimination of WHC sounds (WRAS = 587 ms; all p < .01) when compared 
with the able-bodied controls.  
Altogether, these findings suggest that active use of a sound-producing device, as opposed to 
mere exposure to the sounds, modulates readiness to recognize associated sounds. The 
inability of patients with SCI to move their lower limbs did not influence their ability to 
discriminate sounds of lower limb movement. 
 
Subjective ratings of familiarity and perceived motor reactivity when listening to sounds 
At the end of the test, a VAS was used to measure each participant’s perceived motor 
reactivity and auditory familiarity ratings for each of the four sound categories. The mean 
VAS ratings are shown in Figure 4.3. 
The ANOVA of perceived reactivity motor ratings for each sound (Fig. 3) yielded significant 
effects of sound category (F3,123 = 7.45, p < .0001, ηp2 > .32). Post hoc testing revealed that 
the subjectively perceived motor reactivity during passive listening was higher for human 
action sounds (LRAS = 6.3, URAS = 5.5; p = .14) than for WRAS (4.02; p < .004) or AARS (4.48; p 
 60 
= .03). No significant differences were observed between groups (F2,41 = .87, p = .42). 
Crucially, the ANOVA revealed a significant group × sound category interaction (F6,123 = 
8.76, p < .0001, ηp2 > .40). In patients with SCI, the perceived motor reactivity to sounds that 
implied lower limbs movement (2.8 ± 2.7; p = .0005) consistently received lower ratings than 
in able-bodied individuals (healthy individuals: LRAS = 7.2 ± 1.9; physical therapists: LRAS = 
6.4 ± 2.8) and was significantly lower when compared with WRAS sounds (6.4 ± 2.3) and URAS 
sounds (5.6 ± 3.15). These results suggest that the absence of motor signals reduces the 
reactivity with which actions can be perceived from an associated sound (de Vignemont, 
2011). Instead, the perceived motor reactivity to WHC sounds received higher ratings in the 
patients with SCI (p < .01) than in able-bodied individuals (healthy subjects: WRAS = 1.9 ± 
2.1; physical therapists: WRAS = 3.9 ± 2.7) and was comparable to the perceived motor 
reactivity to URAS sounds (5.6 ± 3.15; p = .43). 
Despite the aural expertise of physical therapists, their perceived motor reactivity to WRAS 
sounds was significantly lower than their reactivity to human (URAS = 6.97 ± 2.7, LRAS = 6.4 ± 
2.8; p = .0001) and AARS (5.3 ± 3.4; p = .002) action sounds. Unsurprisingly, healthy subjects 
were unaccustomed to the WRAS sounds, and their perceived motor reactivity to them was 
significantly lower than their reactivity to the human (URAS = 6.3 ± 2.7, LRAS = 7.2 ± 1.9; p = 
.0001) and was comparable to AARS (3.3 ± 2.8; p = .16) action sounds. No significant 
differences in perceived motor reactivity were observed between the two groups of able-
bodied individuals (p > .24).  
The ANOVA of subjective familiarity ratings (Figure 4.3) revealed a significant main effect 
of sound category (F3,123 = 17.13, p < .0001, ηp2 > .26). Specifically, higher VAS ratings were 
found for human action sounds (LRAS = 8.2, URAS = 8.4) than for non-human action sounds 
(WRAS = 5.49, AARS = 6.8; p < .003). No significant differences in familiarity were observed 
between participant groups (F2,41 = .66, p = .42). However, we did observe a significant group 
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× sound category interaction (F6,123 = 8.3, p < .001, ηp2 > .32). Physical therapists (7.2 ± 1.9) 
and SCI patients (7.02 ± 3.1) had similar levels of familiarity with regard to WRAS actions 
sounds (p > .85), and this level of familiarity was not significantly different from the 
familiarity with human lower limbs (physical therapists: LRAS = 8.23 ± 1.98; SCI patients: 
LRAS = 7.7 ± 2.3) and upper limbs (physical therapists: URAS = 8.25 ± 2.4; SCI patients: URAS = 
7.4 ± 2.4) action sounds and non-human action sounds (physical therapists: AARS = 7.7 ± 1.7; 
SCI patients: AARS = 6.7 ± 2.9; all p > .05). 
As expected, in the group of healthy subjects, the familiarity ratings for WRAS action sounds 
(2.4 ± 2.3) were significantly lower than the familiarity ratings for the human (URAS = 8.8 ± 
1.4, LRAS = 9.1 ± .9; p = .0001) and non-human (ARAS = 6.2 ± 1.9; p = .0001) action sounds. 
The familiarity rating for WRAS was significantly different from those measured in the 
physical therapists and SCI patients (all p < .0001).  
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Figure 4.3 Subjective ratings of action-sound familiarity and perceived motor intensity. The mean 
subjective Visual Analog Scale (VAS) ratings for auditory familiarity and perceived movement for each sound 
category (upper (URAS) and lower (LRAS) limb-related action sounds, wheelchair-related action sounds (WRAS), 
and animal action-related sounds (AARS)) in the three subject groups (healthy individuals, physical therapists and 
individuals with spinal cord injuries). The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM). The asterisks 
(*) indicate significant results from the post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05).  
 
The subjects were also briefly interviewed with regard to their feelings about the auditory 
stimuli. A “yes” or “no” response was required for the following questions: (1) “Do you pay 
more attention to a specific category of auditory stimuli?” and (2) “Do you feel more 
emotional participation when hearing a precise sound category?” In the case of a “yes” 
response, the subject was asked to explain the answer. All subjects stated that they did not pay 
particular attention to the specific sound category. Four SCI patients declared an increase in 
emotional participation when hearing lower limb sounds, while another three reported greater 
emotional participation when hearing animal sounds. Only one SCI patient and one physical 
therapist (who was married to an individual with SCI) experienced more emotional 
involvement when hearing the WHC sounds compared with the other sound categories. Sound 
discrimination does not appear to be explained by category-specific, attention-driving 
tendencies. Presenting the auditory stimuli in a random order may have prevented the subjects 
from focusing their attention on a particular auditory stimulus category. 
Together, these findings suggest that although the SCI patients and auditory experts (i.e. 
physical therapists) demonstrated the same degree of familiarity with the WHC sounds, the 
greatest differences between the three groups occurred with regard to the subjective motor 
experiences associated with WHC and lower limb action sounds. 
 
Subjective reports of the embodiment experience of wheelchair use  
We also used nine question statements (adapted from Pazzaglia et al., 2013) to obtain 
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subjective reports of the corporeal awareness of the wheelchair in SCI patients. The 
questionnaire consisted of nine statements (listed in Figure 4.4) that described implicit and 
explicit tool experiences linked to actual bodily states. The first two components (WCH 
adjusting and WCH awareness) were designed to capture the implicit experience linked to 
wheelchairs. Tools require a considerable deal of effort from their users (diet, maintenance 
and protective behavior) to achieve reliable and smooth usage, as well as a reduced need for 
awareness and attention over time. The remaining components explored the corporeal 
awareness of tools, including the issue of incorporating the wheelchair into the body as a 
substitute for the motor architecture of the limbs. For each statement, the numbers of “true” 
and “false” responses were compared using a binomial test. The responses from 12 patients 
were available for analysis (cases 2 and 10 were patients with incomplete SCIs and did not 
return their questionnaires). 
In the components “adjusting” and “awareness” and incorporating the wheelchair into the 
body as a “substitute” for the motor architecture of the “lower limbs” (Figure 4.4), the number 
of “true” responses was greater than the number of “false” responses (binomial test, p < .01). 
In contrast, the number of “true” and “false” responses did not differ when considering the 
wheelchair as part of the entire body (binomial test, p = .2). This pattern of responses suggests 
that some wheelchair properties are implicitly processed in the same manner as properties of 
the body (de Vignemont, 2011). It also seems that the sense of corporeal wheelchair 
awareness is much more hardwired to the motor architecture of the lower limbs than to the 
motor architecture of the entire body.  
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Figure 4.4 Participant ratings of introspective experiences of wheelchair embodiment. The first four 
questionnaire statements were designed to capture the implicit perceptual experience, and the other statements 
explored the explicit perceptual experience of wheelchair use. For each statement, the numbers of “true” and 
“false” responses were compared using a binomial test.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
Many theories have proposed an association between the perception and execution of actions, 
suggesting that both are coded according to a common representational format (Prinz, 1997, 
Brass et al., 2001, Brass et al., 2000, Craighero et al., 2002, Kilner et al., 2003, Sturmer et al., 
2000, Repp and Knoblich, 2007). Neural studies in healthy (Gazzola et al., 2006, Rizzolatti et 
al., 1996, Doehrmann et al., 2010) and brain-damaged (Pazzaglia et al., 2008) individuals 
indicate that action perception and execution rely on largely overlapping neural substrates. 
Importantly, it is unclear whether lifelong (mobility by lower limbs) and newly acquired 
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(mobility by WHC) perceptual and motor experiences differently impact the integrity of 
action-perception mapping. 
The present study investigated action-sound mapping in SCI patients and revealed three key 
findings. First, SCIs that have induced a total loss of lower limb function do not lead to a 
general reduction of the perceptual-motor mapping of lower limb action sounds. Second, a 
wheelchair can be integrated as part of the body, thus modifying audio-motor interaction. 
Third, the effect of “learning by doing” leads to plastic changes that are distinct from the 
impact of “learning by perception.” 
 
Is action audio-motor mapping disembodied? 
Alteration of the action network involved in the perception of human motor acts may occur in 
the absence of a cortical lesion, such as in blind (Ricciardi et al., 2009, Lewis et al., 2011), 
deaf (Alaerts et al., 2011) and SCI (Arrighi et al., 2011) individuals. This result prompted us 
to investigate whether the somatosensory deafferentation and motor deefferentation of 
specific body parts alters the audio-motor mapping of actions generated by the affected body 
part. Thoracic and lumbar SCI lead to a loss of movement in the legs while sparing arm 
function. Consequently, this type of injury provides an ideal experimental approach for 
exploring how sound actions associated with upper and lower limbs are processed in the same 
individual. As mentioned previously, patients with SCI exhibit reduced perceptual sensitivity 
in the visual domain when compared to the biological motion of the point-light displays of the 
entire body (Arrighi et al., 2011) and specific impairments in the visual perception of form 
and action in the disconnected body parts (Pernigo et al., 2012). In this study, we expected 
that the processing of sounds depicting upper limb actions would be unimpaired while the 
processing of sounds depicting lower limb actions might be degraded. However, we obtained 
psychophysical evidence that paraplegic patients recognize lower and upper limb actions as 
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efficiently as able-bodied individuals. The inability to move and feel the lower limbs did not 
lead to a deficit in the sound discrimination of actions, even several years after the initial 
injury.  
Several mechanisms may explain the preservation of perceptual signaling referred to the 
paralyzed portion of the body following SCI. Although speculative, this scenario may recall 
pathology studies which demonstrate that a small portion of the spinal cord remains intact, 
even in cases of severe and complete spinal cord lesions (Bunge et al., 1993, Bunge et al., 
1997, Guest et al., 2005, Anderson et al., 2004). After injury, spared axons sprout and make 
new connections. Although these projections are insufficient to restore any motor function, 
they can support perceptual-motor interaction, even in cases of complete thoracic lesions 
(Cariga et al., 2002). 
However, the use of the legs for a long period of time prior to injury could be a determining 
factor with regard to the audio motor discrimination of lower limb actions. With a long 
history of absent sensation and movement after injury, accurate perceptual discrimination may 
be mediated by long-term motor representations that were learned before the injury. Studies in 
amputee patients revealed that perceptual sensitivity associated with the missing limb remains 
accurate (Nico et al., 2004), a process that requires motor simulation (Fiorio et al., 2006). 
Moreover, neuroimaging studies have suggested that motor mirroring is activated during the 
observation of limb movements independently of the subject’s actual motor and perceptual 
abilities (Costantini et al., 2005).  
The sounds utilized in the present study were highly relevant to the everyday motor functions 
that the patients had regularly performed prior to injury. These representations could, 
however, be updated and reinforced through visual and acoustic experiences involving 
ambulatory individuals encountered in daily life. Action-related networks may be activated to 
mediate the motor limb sound representation, despite the fact that motor plans have not been 
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utilized for years. Accordingly, the brain regions involved in foot movements appear to 
remain relatively preserved and active even years after the body has been massively 
deafferented⁄deefferented (Corbetta et al., 2002, Cramer et al., 2005, Cramer et al., 2007, 
Hotz-Boendermaker et al., 2011, Hotz-Boendermaker et al., 2008, Alkadhi et al., 2005). 
All of the patients recruited in our study were also involved in a motor program at a 
rehabilitation center. As part of this program, they attempted daily movements and exercise 
training, including attempts at moving the foot and (to a lesser degree) walking. Such 
programs require the use of numerous motor functions (including motor imagery) that prompt 
natural and ecological actions. Accordingly, recent neuroimaging studies demonstrated that a 
common observation-execution network, including the ventral premotor cortex, parietal 
cortex and cerebellum, is activated at a normal level through attempts to move a given body 
part and observations of the movements of other individuals, long after the onset of complete 
SCI (Hotz-Boendermaker et al., 2011, Hotz-Boendermaker et al., 2008, Mattia et al., 2009, 
Mattia et al., 2006, Truccolo et al., 2008). 
Defects in the audio-motor mapping of actions have been reported in brain-damaged patients. 
The preservation of the perceptual ability in SCI patients suggests that the cortical regions 
involved in action simulation could play a compensatory role and facilitate the maintenance of 
intact audio-motor resonance in patients with impaired lower limb motor functions. Therefore, 
studies of either virtual (via transcranial magnetic stimulation) or natural lesions probe the 
essential role of the fronto-parietal regions in mediating the auditory and visual processing of 
body actions (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2004, Ticini et al., 2012, Moro et al., 2008, Fazio et al., 
2009). Instead, the presence of intact audio-motor mapping in patients with profoundly 
impaired body-brain communication may conflict with studies of visual-motor action 
translation in SCI patients. One way to reconcile this potential discrepancy concerns the 
quality of the experience of actions mediated through visual vs. auditory inputs. Indeed, 
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whereas vision allows one to directly simulate a specific action (e.g. grasping an object), 
auditory input may elicit the simulation of more than one action related to the sound that was 
heard (e.g. clapping different hands), thus enabling the simulation of the heard action in 
multiple, indirect ways as well as higher degrees of compensatory flexibility. Importantly, 
although we used ecologically relevant sounds of daily human actions, perceptual alterations 
in SCI studies appear only when a somewhat unnatural task (e.g. the direction of motion 
point-light (Arrighi et al., 2011) and a humanoid form that assumes a sports posture (Pernigo 
et al., 2012) is presented.  
The ability to properly discriminate everyday action-sound after spinal cord injury led to the 
development of rehabilitation programs based on the notion of using audio-motor interactions 
to improve the function of immobile patients. Accordingly, auditory virtual walking may be a 
viable intervention for neuropathic pain following SCI (Moseley, 2007). 
 
Action-sound mapping highlights the plastic nature of novel object embodiment: a portrait of 
SCI 
The present study investigated action-sound mapping in individuals with SCI with 
functioning upper limbs and non-functioning lower limbs who had regained mobility using a 
wheelchair. We provided the first psychophysical evidence that patients with SCI can 
distinguish WHC sounds from other distracting sounds more rapidly than individuals with no 
direct perceptual or motor wheelchair experience. Patient DT, a 22-year-old paraplegic, 
illustrated this process well. He spontaneously reported that he might be able to recognize not 
only the wheelchair but also the identity of other known wheelchair-bound individuals just by 
hearing the WHC sound. Notably, the ability of the audio-motor system to distinguish 
wheelchair actions recalls the greater perceived motor reactivity present when listening 
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passively to WHC sounds. Accordingly, the subjective data also reveal an implicit mechanism 
of adjustment to the tool, as occurs with artificial limb in amputees (de Vignemont, 2011, 
Murray, 2004). It also seems that the sense of corporeal wheelchair awareness is much more 
related to a sense of substitution of the affected body part than to the motor architecture of the 
entire body (Pazzaglia et al., 2013).  
This finding indicates that SCI patients probably redefine or modify their motor abilities, 
appropriating the action schema to include the actual features of the wheelchair. Therefore, 
when a tool extends the movement potential of a physically impaired individual, it may be 
included in the internal representation of the body schema to meet the novel demands of 
immobile limbs. As posited by theoretical studies, the acquisition of wheelchair skills by SCI 
patients alters their body representation by adding corporeal awareness of the device 
(Papadimitriou, 2008, Standal, 2011).  
The experience of wheelchair embodiment has not been directly evaluated using systematic 
quantitative measurements, but has been commonly reported. However, almost five decades 
ago, Arnhoff and Mehl suggested that body image distortion in paraplegia was attributable to 
changes in the dimensions of the “body-wheelchair” combination (Arnhoff and Mehl, 1963). 
More recently, a behavioral study indicated that the altered images of “body-plus-wheelchair” 
in SCI patients enables them to calculate the accurate spatial requirements for their wheelchair 
to pass through a space (Higuchi et al., 2009). This scenario is also consistent with the 
findings of a recent neuroimaging study that compared the motor imagery of tool locomotion 
(i.e. the wheelchair slalom) with the motor imagery of movement without the wheelchair (i.e. 
stair walking). An increased blood oxygen level-dependent signal in the dorsal premotor 
cortex was found during wheelchair movement in a SCI subject (Olsson, 2012). Therefore, 
objects that have been in contact with the body become part of the bodily representation 
(Aglioti et al., 1996, Berlucchi and Aglioti, 1997) and induce short- and long-term 
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neuroplastic changes in the motor system (Giraux et al., 2001) following active (rather than 
passive) use of the body (Cardinali et al., 2009, Cardinali et al., 2012). The incorporation of 
an external tool into the body representation, together with updating and modifying internal 
action representations, indicates the inherently plastic nature of the body schema. Therefore, 
recent studies of tool integration in the corporeal representation revealed bodily changes in 
experienced identity in both patients with SCI (Lenggenhager et al., 2012) and individuals 
with locked-in syndrome (Nizzi et al., 2012). Specifically, the capacity to embody new 
objects may extend an individual’s physical impaired ability and remains a potentially 
unexploited resource for the growing population of those who are severely disabled. 
 
Physical and perceptual practices to forge new learning opportunities 
These findings highlight the unique role of motor practice in learning ability. Individuals with 
SCI, when compared with auditory experts, can closely match aural perception with 
wheelchair-executed motion, enabling these patients to quickly extract and discriminate 
relevant WHC sounds. Visual and auditory wheelchair familiarity, although not fundamental, 
certainly plays a role in the discrimination of its sound. Although the physical therapists did 
not demonstrate the same ability as the wheelchair-bound subjects in recognizing the WHC 
sounds, the mere “observation/audition” ability of the wheelchair-bound subjects enhanced 
their WHC sound discrimination ability when compared with healthy subjects. However, the 
RT readiness in audio-motor interaction with the tool is revealed when the wheelchair is used 
actively, rather than passively. The acquisition of motor skills through physical vs. perceptual 
practice may imply a highly selective coupling of perceptual-motor information. The striking 
effects of perceptual-motor practice with specific objects induce long-term structural changes 
in monkey (Quallo et al., 2009) and in human (Bassolino et al., 2010, Aglioti et al., 2008) 
body representations. The exclusive plastic effect of physical (as opposed to perceptual) 
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learning on the development of new action perception abilities suggests that it is essential for 
people to experience close sensorimotor associations in order to forge new learning 
opportunities (Serino et al., 2007, Bassolino et al., 2010). 
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CHAPTER 5 
A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL ON PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR PROCESS 
OF ACTION-RELATED SOUND 
 
In the previous chapters we provided further evidence of tool and action representation 
plasticity after spinal cord injury. Nevertheless, the underlying neural mechanisms of these 
plasticity processes are still largely unknown. The pioneering work of Iriki and colleagues 
(1996) specifically demonstrated that after tool use, visual receptive fields (RFs) of bimodal 
neurons at the level of the intraparietal sulcus elongated and became responsive to stimuli 
presented at the tip of the tool. Few neurophysiological studies in recent years suggest that 
these effects of tool-use training on the extension of the visual RFs could be explained by 
morphological changes at the level of synapses connection within the parietal lobe. More 
specifically, Ishibashi and colleagues (Ishibashi et al., 2002) suggested that the mechanism 
underlying this phenomenon could be the creation of new synaptic connections from the 
visual related areas cortex in the parietal cortex with the somatosensory neurons in the 
intraparietal sulcus (Ishibashi et al., 2002; Hihara, et al., 2006). However, much is still 
unknown about higher order phenomena such as embodiment and decision-making. 
In this chapter, a tentative has been made in order to create a theoretical model describing 
these neural mechanisms, taking advantages of computation neural network modeling. Neural 
network models are information elaboration systems aimed at simulating neuron behavior in a 
realistic way. In this case neural network models and computer simulation techniques 
represent a useful tool to investigate the mechanisms underlying decision-making processes 
responsible for different performance in sound of action recognition. 
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5.1 Elements of neural networks 
The term “computational” refers to the use of computer and mathematical principles for the 
calculation of responses and the simulation of behavior, of a given system. A neural network 
implemented in the computer is a mathematical model that simulates the behavior of neurons, 
or groups of neurons, connected between each other. This type of structure is particularly 
suitable to capture specific aspects of the human brain capacities, such as parallel processing, 
generalization, and reconstruction of a stimulus or a memory from a partial set of information. 
Neural networks also allow simulating the processes of various forms of learning, for example 
associative, supervised, conditional, or with reinforcement. A neural network is composed of 
units connected between each other. The network activates its own output in function of the 
values received at input. The activation of the output of the units can be modeled through a 
function. The connections between the units have associated weights that modulate the 
contribution of the respective unit of origin. The weights can be changed depending on the 
output values of the network by simulating the process of learning. Groups of units can be 
organized to form functional layers of a network such as the input one, the intermediate 
processing one and output one, as shown in Figure 5.1. 
                                            
Figure 5.1 Schematic representation of a simple neural network.  
Input	  
Layer 
Output	  
Layer 
Hidden 
Layer 
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There are multiple networks to model the various types of learning. Here I will briefly 
describe three of them, highlighting their strengths and limitations: 
1. Hopfield network: this network (Hopfield, 1982) has a generic structure in which each unit 
is connected with each other except with itself. The weights of the connections are all equal to 
each other (Figure 5.2). The input stage also corresponds to the output one. This structure 
allows to model the Hebbian learning process, characterized by the strengthening of the 
connections in which the units of input and output are both active within a specific time 
window. In the neural networks this condition is realized considering the simultaneity of 
activations. The formula describing this process is: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
The information storage, and then the learning, is represented by the reinforcement of the 
connection wij in terms of increase of Δw, between the input unit and the output one, while η 
represents the learning coefficient.	  The set of all weights of the network can be summarized in 
a matrix with j columns and i rows. The process to calculate the variations of weights in the 
connections needs the calculation of the learning formula, multiplying the value of the 
activated units, for each column and each row of the matrix. The algorithm is:	  
for j = 1: N 
       for i = 1: N 
             W (j, i) = W (j, i) + 1 / T * q (j) * q (i) 
where q is the activation of the unit and W (j, i) as second member is the value of the 
connection before updating. 
This network is able to provide a maximum output response in case of input corresponding to 
memorized stimuli. In case of noise or partial impairment of the input stimulus, the network 
Δ wji= η∗ y j∗ xi
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will be able to reconstruct the output. The stored stimuli become stable states, called 
attractors. A limitation of this type of network is that non-learned attractors can be 
accidentally created. Furthermore, the storage memory of these networks is limited. 
                                           
Figure 5.2 Schematic representation of a Hopfield network.  
 
2. Kohonen network: this network (Kohonen & Teuvo, 1982) is constituted of one input layer 
and one processing layer. Each input unit is connected with those of the second layer and the 
units of the second layer are all connected together. When an input stimulus is presented, the 
unit of the second layer with the maximum response is able to inhibit the other, with gradually 
growing force at the increasing of the distance from it (Figure 5.3). 
                                       
Figure 5.3 Schematic representation of a Kohonen network.  
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This network is suitable for modeling a type of unsupervised competitive learning, in which 
the units of the second layer are specialized in the recognition of a particular input pattern. As 
the pattern changes, the network reorganizes itself and changes its structure. The formula 
describing the competition between adjacent units, also known as Ojas’ rule (Oja, 1982), is: 
	  
	  
The second row shows how both a part of Hebbian learning and a part able to contain the 
variation around the activated unit, constitute this computation. 
 
3. Actor-Critic network: this type of structure includes a network responsible for the execution 
of an action, according to established rules, and a control network to evaluate the difference 
between the obtained result and the expected one, through a specific function (Figure 5.4). 
 
                                 
Figure 5.4 Schematic representation of an actor critic network.  
Δ wji= η∗ y j∗ (xi− w ji)
Δ wji= η∗ y j∗ xi− η∗ y j∗ wji
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The formula for the calculation of the weights matrix is now more complicated. 
	  
Without going into the details, we just note the presence of a further modulation element of 
the weight of the connection, ε, linked to the error gradient, i.e. to the direction of its trend. 
The more is the distance from the desired value, the more is the increasing of the coefficient. 
This type of network allows to solve discrimination problems and to simulate non-linear 
processes of learning by reinforcement. 
 
5.2 Embodiment and neural networks: a proposal for a model 
In order to choose the best-suited configuration for our neural network model, I will briefly 
summarize the salient aspects of data and considerations shown in Chapter 4. 
We previously showed that: 
– Reaction times performance of patients with SCI for wheelchair related action sounds (WRAS) 
is significantly than the one showed by the other groups. This latency improvement is not 
accompanied by changes in accuracy, ruling out any potential speed/accuracy trade-off 
effects. 
– SCI patients show similar performances for sounds related to actions of the lower (LRAS = 
716.0 ms) and upper (URAS = 708.1ms) limbs (P = 0.87), suggesting that audio-motor 
mapping can be retained even when the effector limb is no longer functional. 
– SCI patients have both perceptual and motor experiences with the wheelchair, physical 
therapists have only the perceptual one, and healthy controls don't have any kind of 
knowledge with this tool. 
– To accomplish the test individuals express a form of decision, discriminating not only the 
target sound but also its relation with the probe sounds. 
Δ wji= η∗ ϵ∗ f ( x)
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– At the end of the process there must be a motor action to express the decision by pressing a 
button. 
In order to integrate all these aspects in the model, we prefigure the presence of the following 
blocks: 
– An input block with perceptual stimuli; 
– A memory block that stores the sound repertoire (perceptual experience). 
– A memory block that stores the action repertoire (motor experience); 
– A decision block that compute the decision process; 
– An output block that execute the choice; 
The complete neural network is shown in the Figure 5.5. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Schematic representation of the proposed neural network model.  
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This schema is common and replicated for every group. The information contained in the 
memory blocks differentiates the groups. In order to discriminate and store the information, 
an encoding process is required. Thereby, a unique code will be associated to every single 
stimulus. We will use a sequence of four numbers: the value "1" will indicate the presence of 
the corresponding sound category and "0" will indicate its absence. Organizing the digits in a 
vector, the stimuli will be encoded in the following way: 
URAS [1 0 0 0], LRAS [0 1 0 0], WRAS [0 0 1 0], AARS [0 0 0 1]. 
These vectors are orthogonal to each other, as none of them shows the symbol "1" in the same 
position. This simplifies the calculation of the behavior of the network and its representation. 
In case of absence of information, (i.e. no stimulus) we will use the null vector [0 0 0 0]. 
 
Sound Memory Block 
Recognizing an acoustic stimulus means that it has been experienced before and it is possible 
to compare the actual perception with the stored representation in our memory. In 
computational terms, this means that there is a memory block that maintains the information 
to compare through a learning process in order to recognize this stimulus. Table 5.1 
summarizes the stored information for every group. 
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Table 5.1 Action auditory representation stored in memory, for every group and each sound category. 
In the column relative to the control group, we have the presence of the representative vector 
for the URAS, LRAS and AARS stimuli, but not of WRAS, in place of which we have the null 
vector. 
The vectors of the stimuli will be represented synthetically through an array of stimuli, called 
Q. For the control group we will have:  
QCO	  =	  	  
	  
while for the other groups we will have: 
QSCI	  =	  QTH	  =	  	  
 
[1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 1]
[1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 1 00 0 0 1]
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At this stage, we will omit the dynamic aspects of memory formation. Instead we analyze the 
general characteristics required by this type of long-term learning, a key element for the 
implementation of the block, considering the presence of competition and supervision. If the 
acoustic memory was purely competitive there would be an overwriting of the most recent (or 
most used) stimuli on the oldest or less used ones. For example, avoiding knocking at a door 
for a certain period of time should be replaced by the sound of the bell used in substitution. 
As regards the necessity of a supervised learning we can consider that the storage of a certain 
sound can be simply explained through an associative, Hebbian-like, learning process, 
without involving additional mechanisms. 
With this background, the sound memory block can be simply modeled by a Hopfield 
network, described by a W matrix obtained as a product of the Q matrix of the stimuli for its 
transpose Q ', divided by the number of possible patterns T to learn. In our case the pattern 
correspond to the four stimuli: 
Ws = 1/T*Q*Q' =  
	  
 
Since we chose a base of orthogonal vectors the transposed matrix coincides with the original 
one, so that the product of matrices is reduced to the product of a matrix for itself, which 
gives as result the starting matrix. We compute a different Ws matrix for every group, so that 
we have three different matrices describing the sound memories: 
WSSCI, WSTH, WSCO. 
1/4∗ [1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 1]∗ [
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1]
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Data collected on individuals with SCI are in line with the modeling of Hopfield network. 
After 6 months from the beginning of wheelchair use, all individuals express the same 
performance of recognition of WRAS, and this result is independent from the total amount of 
time spent on the wheelchair. The crucial element seems to be the time window from the 
onset of tool use and not the absolute time of its use. This is consistent with a classic learning 
process in which a plateau can be reached after a certain period of learning. 
 
 
 
Motor Memory Block 
We have to highlight some differences between this block and the Sound Memory Block. 
This part of the model represents the memory of a specific motor-action and not the repertoire 
of the actions that individuals can express in a specific moment. In fact, referring to LRAS 
recognition performances, there are not significant statistical differences among groups, 
indicating that what is relevant for the task is the previous knowledge of a specific motor 
action and not its actual execution. One possible explanation could be to postulate the 
existence of two different memory blocks, one for “innate” actions and another one for 
“acquired” actions, interacting together. However, this hypothesis is difficult both to verify 
and to falsify. Moreover, it introduces in the model a level of complexity, without adding any 
further relevant information to the description of the phenomenon. The simplest explanation 
is to consider the time at which the trauma occurred and the repertoire of motor actions 
already acquired from the individual at that moment. Also in this case, as in the sound 
memory block, a competitive learning mechanism seems to be unsuitable to describe the 
phenomenon, as it should occur at least one of the following situations: 
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- None of the individuals with SCI should respond to the LRAS stimuli; 
- The performance of individuals with SCI to the LRAS stimuli should be well below the 
performance of controls and therapists in the same category. 
Both of these cases are in contrast with the empirical data collected. Therefore, we discard the 
use of a Kohonen network and we use a Hebbian network. This model, added in the scheme 
described before, is able to explain the "re-activation" of the motor memory, through a cross-
modal process involving both vision and hearing (Alaerts et al., 2009). Table 5.2 shows the 
content of the motor memory block. In this case we have the presence of the lower limbs 
information for all groups and the absence of information related to the action sounds 
produced by animals. 
                                   
Table 5.2 Action motor representation stored in memory, for every group and each sound category. 
 
The procedure for the calculation of the matrix describing the Hopfield network for the motor 
memory block is the same as in the sound memory block, so that we will have: 
WMSCI, WMTH, WMCO. 
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Decision Block 
The final stage of our neural network must be able to carry out the computation of a decision-
making process, solving the competition between different options, which arise from different 
possible input stimuli. The basic model selected to solve this task is a biological neural 
network for optimal selection, introduced by Bogacz (Bogacz et al, 2005). The structure of the 
network and its behavior is reported in Figure 5.6.  
                 
Figure 5.6 Schematic representation of Bogacz network. 
 
The output units individually receive their input and are mutually linked through an inhibitory 
connection. In this way just one connection will prevail as function of the force of the input 
signal, making simultaneously silent the others. The "c" factor represents a bias element and 
is able to polarize the model towards a choice rather than the other. The formula for the 
calculation of the unit activation is: 
 
The parameters of the formula are: 
- Δ is the integration time, i.e. the time interval used to calculate the result of the formula, 
expressed in milliseconds (ms); 
unit N= unit N+ (δ/τ)∗ (− κ∗ unitN− w∗ unit (J ≠ N )+ Input N+ NoiseN) ;
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- Τ is the speed of the activation process between the units; 
- Κ is a parameter that expresses negative autocorrelation; 
- W is a parameter corresponding to a mutual inhibition between the units; 
- InputN is the input signal of the unit N; 
- NoiseN is a noise factor. 
The generalization to N-dimensions uses an expression in which each element becomes a 
parameter array, allowing the simultaneous computation of N units at one time. 
 
In this case, K is a diagonal matrix, a matrix of autocorrelations, while W has all the elements 
on the diagonal equal to 0, since each unit can inhibit the others but not itself. I is the 
contribution from the two memory blocks examined previously, and N is the matrix of the 
noise elements. 
To test the behavior of the model we prepared three neural networks, one for each group, 
triggered by the four categories of stimuli. For the computation of the behavior of the neural 
network unit we can use both the synchronous or asynchronous method. With the 
synchronous method all the values of the variables are updated at a specific time, and the 
relative value of the output units is calculated. In this way all the variables remain stationary 
until the next calculation moment. With the asynchronous method the variables are updated 
one at a time. In our case we used the first method. 
The levels of activation of the output units for each group are shown in the following figures, 
as function of the input stimulus. The horizontal line shows an arbitrary threshold value in 
order to compare the points of intersection of the curve: the more the activation is high, the 
U= U+ (Δ /T )∗ (− K∗ U− U∗ W+ I+ N )
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more the intersection is shifted to the origin, indicating a shorter time to reach the threshold 
and, therefore, the expressed choice. 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Activation levels of the neural network with URAS and LRAS input stimuli, for each group. 
	  
In the case of WRAS we have three different activations, in line with the requirements and the 
structure of the model. Consequently, the level of activation will be: 
TwSCI >TwTH >TwCO 
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Figure 5.8 Activation levels of the neural network with WRAS input stimuli, for each group. 
In the end, we have the graph of the performance relative to the sounds produced by animals. 
In this case, as for the stimuli relative to the limbs, the performance is equal in the three 
groups, but with less activation due to the absence of the active motor component. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Activation levels of the neural network with ARAS input stimuli, for each group 
The figure below shows all the responses from the various units of the different groups in 
order to compare immediately the different cases. 
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Figure 5.10 Comparison of activation levels of the neural network for all input stimuli in each group. 
 
5.3 Limitations and Considerations  
Although able to explain many aspects of the behavioral data collected, the present model is 
currently limited by three main points: 
- Aspects of learning and salience are expressed by a single parameter; 
- The computational aspect of dynamic integration of the information relative to the sound-
action association is still absent. 
- The ability to implement the principles identified in the phenomenon to a virtual embodied 
level is still lacking. 
The last point is most challenging for the implementation. It would allow to realize a model as 
close as possible to the reality. In this model, a robotic motor system affected by a lesion 
could potentially reorganize the underlying neural network, depending on the tool 
replacement. 
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We demonstrate that this model can simulate the process underlying the performances 
expressed by different individuals exposed to different auditory stimuli. We assumed that the 
physical experience of an action can produce different performances when perceiving a 
related sound, but we reported some evidences that this phenomena changes depending on 
tool embodiment. It is still possible that different tools have different “salience level”. An 
alternative explanation could refer to the concept of “salience of the action” (i.e. to what 
extent the action is important for the individual). From this point of view SCI individuals may 
respond faster at the WRAS simply because is “highly salient”. In this case we can think to a 
different model where all individuals share a structure and the difference among them is in 
terms of action salience. This is a very different hypothesis from what we considered as far. 
How can we model the salience of an action? We can think of salience as a reinforcement 
process, where what is useful and create advantage for the individual is preferred and 
strengthened. Given this, if using a wheelchair gives more opportunities than other options, it 
becomes very relevant for the individual and increases the valence of all elements related to it. 
The question then becomes: Do SCI individuals respond faster at the WRAS because is 
“salient” or because of the “embodiment”? And how to explain the different performances 
between TH and SCI groups? To what extent is the wheelchair salient for TH group? 
There is a further option we can consider, trying to reconcile these different points of view. 
What is salient for SCI is something related to autonomy and interaction with the 
environment. These aspects, in terms of adaptation, may lead to an increased probability of 
survival and success and to a concrete advantage for the fitness. It is possible that through the 
action that causes motor memory by embodiment, the individual system checks the 
consequent advantage and increases the “level of salience” of the action itself. For physical 
therapist, because of the nature of their job, wheelchair sounds are salient but not so relevant 
for their lives, as for SCI group. In this light “salience” and “embodiment” could be two 
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parallel aspects of two interacting processes, feed forward one each other. To investigate this 
issue we can either empirically create some tests to dissociate salience and motor memory of 
the action; or virtually model different structures that predict our results. A better 
understanding of these aspects can lead to create new physical therapies and training 
programs, based on both natural “embodied” and “salient” processes. 
 
5.4 Operating Environment and Code 
The model has been implemented using Matlab© 2012a V7.14 for students, on Windows 7 
operating system. The code is shown below. The usual conventions of programming in 
Matlab are shown, where green represents the code comments. The beginning of the listed 
code contains all the variables with their initialization values. In case you want to run the 
simulation with different values, such as changing the learning rate of the network, it is 
possible to change only the variable at the beginning of the code, avoiding updating it in all 
instances in which it is used. 
 
%%% EMBODIMENT MODEL %%% 
  
% Clear all 
clear all %Delete variables from work memory 
clc   %Delete previous outputs and commands from command window 
close all %Closes opened windows, e.g. of previous figures 
  
% Constant parameters. Note: base time unit is the second 
  
SIMU_LENG = 30;        %In seconds 
SIMU_TIME_UNIT = 500; %Simulation time unit is milliseconds 
DELT = 1;             %Integration time step, in milliseconds 
DELT_SECO = DELT/SIMU_TIME_UNIT; %Integration time step, in seconds  
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MAX_STEP = (SIMU_LENG * SIMU_TIME_UNIT)/DELT; %Steps of simulation 
Ni=4; %input unit 
No=4; % output unit 
T=Ni; 
  
TAU  = 1000; % Speed of processes within units  
K    = 0.2    % K is the first Bogacz's key parameter, corresponding to 
negative self-recurrency 
%W    = K    % W is the second to Bogacz's key parameter, corresponding to 
mutual inhibition. If = K, efficient decision process 
 W = ones(Ni) * K; 
 W = W.* ( 1 -eye(Ni)); 
  
 smooth=0.5; 
  
q1 = [ 1 0 0 0 ]'; % Upper limb stimulus 
q2 = [ 0 1 0 0 ]'; % Lower limb stimulus 
q3 = [ 0 0 1 0 ]'; % Wheelchair stimulus 
qhalf = [0 0 0.8 0]'; %used for simulating the CO's training in recognizing 
wheelchair sound 
q4 = [ 0 0 0 1 ]'; %Animal stimulus 
no = [0 0 0 0]'; 
  
Q = double([q1 q2 q3 q4]); %Stimulus Matrix% 
Cs = double([q1 q2 no q4]); %Sound Stimulus Matrix CO% 
Ps = double([q1 q2 q3 q4]); %Sound Stimulus Matrix ML% 
Ts = double([q1 q2 q3 q4]); %Sound Stimulus Matrix TE% 
  
Cm = double([q1 q2 no no]); %Motor Stimulus Matrix CO% 
Pm = double([q1 q2 q3 no]); %Motor Stimulus Matrix ML% 
Tm = double([q1 q2 no no]); %Motor Stimulus Matrix TE% 
  
WCs = (1/T)*Cs*Cs'; %Hopfield Sound Matrix CO% 
WPs = (1/T)*Ps*Ps'; %Hopfield Sound Matrix ML% 
WTs = (1/T)*Ts*Ts'; %Hopfield Sound Matrix TE% 
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WCm = (1/T)*Cm*Cm'; %Hopfield Motor Matrix CO% 
WPm = (1/T)*Pm*Pm'; %Hopfield Motor Matrix ML% 
WTm = (1/T)*Tm*Tm'; %Hopfield Motor Matrix TE% 
  
WsInpu = ones(4)*0.5; 
WmInpu = ones(4)*0.5; 
WS=[WCs; WTs; Wps]; %We use one matrix of matrix to compute once all the 
activations% 
WM=[WCm; WTm; WPm]; 
  
  
TIME_FOR_NOIS_RESE = 1; %= DELT_SECO; 
NOIS_SIZE = 0.1; 
STEP_FOR_NOIS_RESE = (TIME_FOR_NOIS_RESE * SIMU_TIME_UNIT)/DELT; 
  
% Variables of model 
step = 0; 
  
  
% Variables Matrix 
     nois = zeros(1,4); 
unit = zeros(1,4); 
unitC =  unit; 
unitT =  unit; 
unitP = unit; 
  
% Variables for collecting data to be plot 
unitHist = zeros(4, MAX_STEP); 
unitHistC = unitHist; 
unitHistT = unitHist; 
unitHistP = unitHist; 
scrsz = get(0,'ScreenSize'); 
figure('Position',[scrsz(1)/2 0 scrsz(3) scrsz(4)/2]); 
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%for index = 1:4 
     stim = Q(:,3)'*1;%*rand(); smooth 
     
    perc=stim*WTs; 
    motor=stim*WTm; 
        INPU = perc+motor; 
        INPU2=(WS+WM)*stim'; 
 
% Program step and initialization of units 
      unit = unit.*0; 
      unitC = unitC.*0; 
      unitT = unitT.*0; 
      unitP = unitP.*0; 
for step = 2:MAX_STEP 
     
 if mod(step, STEP_FOR_NOIS_RESE) == (STEP_FOR_NOIS_RESE-1) 
      nois = (rand(1,4)*2-1) * NOIS_SIZE;     
    end 
     
unit = unit + (DELT/TAU) * (-K * unit - unit*W + INPU + nois); 
 
unitC = unitC + (DELT/TAU) * (-K * unitC - unitC*W + INPU2(1:4)' + nois); 
 
unitT = unitT + (DELT/TAU) * (-K * unitT - unitT*W + INPU2(5:8)' + nois); 
 
unitP = unitP + (DELT/TAU) * (-K * unitP - unitP*W + INPU2(9:end)' + nois); 
  
    % Activate these if you want to keep units > 0 
    if unit(1) < 0 
        unit(1) = 0; 
    end 
    if unit(2) < 0 
        unit(2) = 0; 
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    end 
    if unit(3) < 0 
        unit(3) = 0; 
    end 
    if unit(4) < 0 
        unit(4) = 0; 
    end 
     if unitC(1) < 0 
        unitC(1) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitC(2) < 0 
        unitC(2) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitC(3) < 0 
        unitC(3) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitC(4) < 0 
        unitC(4) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitT(1) < 0 
        unitT(1) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitT(2) < 0 
        unitT(2) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitT(3) < 0 
        unitT(3) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitT(4) < 0 
        unitT(4) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitP(1) < 0 
        unitP(1) = 0; 
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    end 
    if unitP(2) < 0 
        unitP(2) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitP(3) < 0 
        unitP(3) = 0; 
    end 
    if unitP(4) < 0 
        unitP(4) = 0; 
    end 
    %Collect data 
 
    unitHistC(:, step) = unitC'; 
    unitHistT(:, step) = unitT'; 
    unitHistP(:, step) = unitP'; 
  
end 
  
% Graphics 
  
xs=0; xe=15000; ys = 0.5; ye = 0.5; 
  
x = 1:MAX_STEP; 
  
subplot(3,4,1); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x,unitHistC(1, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Control stimulus 1') 
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subplot(3,4,2); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x,unitHistC(2, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Control stimulus 2') 
  
subplot(3,4,3); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x, unitHistC(3, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Control stimulus 3') 
  
subplot(3,4,4); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x, unitHistC(4, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Control stimulus 4') 
  
subplot(3,4,5); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x,unitHistT(1, :)); 
hold on  
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axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Therapist stimulus 1') 
  
subplot(3,4,6); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x,unitHistT(2, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Therapist stimulus 2') 
  
subplot(3,4,7); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x, unitHistT(3, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Therapist stimulus 3') 
  
subplot(3,4,8); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x, unitHistT(4, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Therapist stimulus 4') 
  
subplot(3,4,9); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
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plot(x, unitHistP(1, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Patient stimulus 1') 
  
subplot(3,4,10); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x, unitHistP(2, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Patient stimulus 2') 
  
subplot(3,4,11); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x, unitHistP(3, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Patient stimulus 3') 
  
subplot(3,4,12); 
line([xs xe], [ys ye]); 
hold on 
plot(x, unitHistP(4, :)); 
hold on  
  
axis([0 MAX_STEP 0 2]) 
title('Patient stimulus 4') 
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CHAPTER 6 
DON’T LOOK AT MY WHEELCHAIR: CHANGING PEOPLE’S BIAS 
THROUGH SOCIAL INTERACTION 
 
[This research has been submitted in: Galli G, Lenggehager B, Scivoletto G, Molinari M, 
Pazzaglia M. Don’t look at my wheelchair: changing people’s bias through social interaction. 
Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience.] 
 
6.1 Aims and Hypotheses 
The dramatic change in body representation that occur after a sudden transformation in the 
structure of the physical body, such as the spinal cord injury, surely assume a role in social 
and affective dynamics as a function of different types of experiences. Considering our 
cultural influences, personal experiences, and normative expectations, simply being a 
wheelchair user is enough to attract negative stereotyping. Although this theme has become 
an important research topic, two essential related matters continue to be largely unaddressed. 
The first concerns the question of whether is there any dissociation in explicit/implicit 
prejudice-based attitudes about disability according to the group-membership. The second 
relates to whether we can actively counteract the presence of implicit/explicit bias.  
To this purpose, in this study we sought to explore the presence of stereotypes toward 
wheelchair-bound patients with spinal cord injury (SCI), determining whether an in-
group/out-group bias was present in healthy subjects (who have had no past experience with 
paraplegic patients) compared with physical therapists (who have had extensive experience 
with paraplegic patients) and paraplegic patients (Experiment 1). Based on the notion that 
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stereotypes and prejudices are more readily observed at implicit rather than explicit levels, we 
asked participants both to perform an ad-hoc modified version of the Implicit Association 
Test and to express their opinion explicitly. More importantly, we sought to investigate, if 
such hardwired biases can be modified by a personal interaction with an individual with SCI 
(Experiment 2). 
 
6.2 Materials and methods 
6.2.1 EXPERIMENT I:  
Participants 
Fifteen subjects with established SCI (13 men; mean age, 38.07 years; range 19–56 years), 15 
healthy control subjects without SCI (11 men; mean age, 37.3 years; range 23–50 years), and 
15 physical therapists working with paraplegic patients (11 men; mean age, 37.8 years; range 
25–58 years) were recruited at Fondazione Santa Lucia Hospital in Rome, Italy. All therapists 
were employed full-time and had an average of five years’ experience with in-patient 
rehabilitation (range: 1 to 25 years).  
The neurological injury level of the 15 SCI subjects (Table 6.1) was determined by 
experienced neurologists using the American Spinal Injury Association (ASIA) international 
standards for the classification of spinal cord injury. All patients were recruited from 
physiotherapy programs for SCI patients and were in the chronic injury phase (6 months post- 
injury). None of the SCI patients had suffered a head or brain lesion associated with the 
trauma leading to the injury.  
No participant presented signs of psychiatric disorder, and none had a history of substance 
abuse. All subjects were right-handed as determined using the 10-item version of the 
 101 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Informed written consent was obtained for 
all procedures, and the study was approved by the local ethics committee of Fondazione Santa 
Lucia, Rome.  
 
Table 6.1 Clinical and demographic data of the spinal cord injury patients. The clinical neurological level 
of the lesion (T, thoracic; L, lumbar) was reported for the subjects with spinal cord injury (SCI). The 
neurological and functional levels of the injury were determined using the American Impairment Scale (AIS).  
 
Stimuli and Test description 
We adapted the classical IAT test (Greenwald et al. 1998) in order to reveal implicit 
associations between concepts that often reflect the strength to which a person holds a 
particular societal stereotype. In each IAT trial, a single stimulus is presented on the screen. 
The task of the participant is to classify it as quickly and accurately as possible into its 
respective category (for a detailed description of the task and its analysis please see 
Greenwald et al. 2003). For the current IAT variant, the stimuli consisted of 8 paraplegic-
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related pictures and 8 non paraplegic-related pictures. Pictures were created using a 3D 
creation software (Poser 9, SmithMicro Software). All samples were depicted as seated, but 
paraplegic samples seated on a wheelchair, while non-paraplegic models seated on an 
armchair. Eight negative common words (ugly, evil, failure, terrible, agony, discomfort, 
horrible, pain), and eight positive common words (glory, peace, wonderful, laugh, joy, 
happiness, love, pleasure) were chosen. A schematic representation of stimuli and procedure 
is displayed in Figure 6.1.	  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Schematic representation of the Implicit Association Test. In each IAT trial, a single stimulus is 
presented on the screen. The task of the participant is to classify it as quickly and accurately as possible into its 
respective category. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated at a distance of approximately 50 cm from a 17-inch monitor 
(resolution: 1024x768 pixels). Presentation of the stimuli and registration of answers were 
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controlled using the E-Prime software version 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools, INC). 
Answers were given pressing the appropriate left-hand (Q) or right-hand (P) key, according to 
the sorting choice of the subject. We instructed subjects to answer as fast and accurate as they 
could, since IAT scores ground both on accuracy rating and reaction times. Instructions were 
repeated before starting every new block and category cues on the left/right hand corner 
remained on the screen for the entire duration of the block. Following the procedures of 
Greenwald et al. (2003), we mixed up pictures and words in seven blocks, as follows: (a) a 
20-trial target picture discrimination block (the Italian word “Paraplegico” ("Paraplegic") 
appeared in the top left-hand corner and the Italian word “Deambulante” ("Walking") 
appeared in the top right-hand corner); (b) a 20-trial attribute discrimination block (the Italian 
word “Buono” ("Pleasant") appeared in the top left-hand corner of the screen and the Italian 
word “Cattivo” ("Unpleasant") in the top right-hand corner); (c) a 20-trial ‘‘practice’’ 
combination block with both pictures and attributes (the words "Paraplegic/Pleasant" 
appeared in the top left-hand corner while the words "Walking/Unpleasant" appeared in the 
top right-hand corner); (d) a 40-trial congruent test block of the same combination in (c); (e) a 
20-trial target discrimination block in which the target categories were reversed ("Paraplegic" 
now appeared in the top right-hand corner of the screen and "Walking" in the top left-hand 
corner); (f) a 20-trial practice reversed combination block ("Paraplegic/Unpleasant" now 
appeared in the top right-hand corner and "Walking/Pleasant" now appeared in the top left-
hand corner); and (g) a 40-trial congruent test block of the same combination in (f).  
The stimuli for the target picture and attribute discrimination blocks were presented randomly, 
as the stimuli for the combination blocks. Incorrect responses resulted in a red ‘X’ being 
presented on the screen. A 250-ms interval separated each trial after a response was made in 
all blocks.  
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Questionnaires  
Explicit preference 
Next to the implicit bias we evaluated explicit preference toward healthy or paraplegic 
individuals. Participants were instructed to rate how much they prefer one out of these two 
categories on a visual, vertical 10-cm analogue scale (VAS). Participants were asked to 
indicate their explicit preference with a sign along the VAS line. The position was then 
converted into a numerical value. 
 
Empathy 
Participants were asked to fill the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1996), a self-
report measure on empathic dispositions, comprising 28 mixed positive and negative 
statements. Using a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 [“Does not describe me very well”] 
to 5 [“Does describe me very well”]), participants rated each statement. The questionnaire 
comprises 4 subscales, each with 7 items: Empathetic Concern (EC i.e. the tendency to 
experience feelings of sympathy and compassion for unfortunate others), Perspective Taking 
(PT i.e. the reported tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of 
others in everyday life), Fantasy Scale (FS i.e. the measure of tendency to imaginatively 
transpose oneself into fictional situations) and Personal Distress (PD i.e. the tendency to 
experience distress and discomfort in response to extreme distress in others).  
 
Data Handling 
Performance on the IAT was scored using the algorithm proposed by Greenwald et al. (1998). 
Data from the IAT, the IRI and the VAS were analyzed with one-way analysis of variance 
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(ANOVAs) in which group (controls C, paraplegics P, or therapists T) was the between-
subject variable. All pair-wise comparisons were performed using the Duncan’s post hoc test. 
A significance threshold of p < .05 was set for all statistical analyses. The data are reported as 
the mean ± standard error of the mean (SEM). Moreover, Pearson‘s correlations tests were 
run for subjective ratings and the IAT scores. All behavioral data from Experiment 1 are 
reported in Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5. 
 
6.2.3 EXPERIMENT II:  
Participants 
The study included the participation of 40 healthy subjects (20 women, mean age 28.07 years 
± 7.37 SD, range 19–48). They were different from those involved in the previous task, and 
all were unaware of the specific aim of the study. No participant presented signs of 
psychiatric disorder, and none had a history of substance abuse. All subjects were right-
handed as determined using the 10-item version of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). Informed written consent was obtained for all procedures, and the local 
ethics committee of Fondazione Santa Lucia, Rome, approved the study.  
 
Procedure 
This experiment was done in three different sessions: 1) a pre manipulation session, 2) an 
interaction session and 3) a post manipulation session, all in the same day and lasting 
approximately 90 minutes in total. 
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Pretest session 
The pre-manipulation session included the completion of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI, Davis, 1996), the explicit measurement and the first version of the Implicit Association 
Test (both described in 6.2.1). Since we administered the IAT test two times we created two 
parallel versions of the test (one with the paraplegic and positive combination first, version A; 
and one with the paraplegic and negative combination first, version B). Order effects are 
commonly reported in studies using the IAT and do not appear to impact the reliability and 
validity of this measure (Nosek et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the IAT versions were 
counterbalanced across participants in two ways to prevent methodological confounds. 
Participants who showed a positive bias toward walking people were randomly grouped into 
two groups, according to different experimental manipulation. Groups didn’t show any 
difference in terms of age, gender and education (all ps > 0.5). Participants who did not show 
the bias (n=10) were excluded from the study, and did not take part to the other sessions of 
the experiment.  
 
Manipulation 
The interaction session was different for the two groups. Group 1 (i.e. social interaction 
group)’s interaction included a 45 min discussion session with a paraplegic patient (G.Z.) who 
participated in the study. G.Z., male, 42 years old, was recruited at Fondazione Santa Lucia 
Hospital in Rome, Italy. He had a traumatic spinal cord injury 760 days before the beginning 
of the study. The neurological injury level was determined using the American Spinal Injury 
Association (ASIA) international standards for the classification of spinal cord injury. An 
expert neurologist examined G.Z. and ascribed to him the AIS grade A. The interaction was 
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built on a semi-structured plot conducted by G.Z. Different topics were treated along the talk, 
and time-to-time G.Z., had to show, or talk about, some limitations due to the disability. 
Group 2 (i.e. passive interaction)’s interaction consisted in 45 minutes listening to an audio 
registration about some limitations due to the disability. The recording included 4 different 
topics. In particular, some clinical aspects of paraplegia (etiology, phases of spinal shock, 
sexual functioning), the use of technological tools (special cars, public transportation, home 
automation, the exoskeleton), and some examples of possible discomfort (the problem of 
architectural barriers and the social reintegration and employment) have been addressed in the 
recording. To ensure that subjects paid constant attention to the recording a short 
questionnaire about the topics was administered. 
 
Post-manipulation session 
The post interaction session included the second version of the IAT.  
 
Data Handling 
Performance on the IAT was scored using the algorithm fully described in 2.1.5 (Greenwald 
et al., 1998). Data were analyzed with a 2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) in which group 
(Group 1 vs Group 2) was the between subject variable and session (Pre manipulation vs. Post 
manipulation) was the within subject variable. A significance threshold of p < .05 was set for 
all statistical analyses. All pair-wise comparisons were performed using the Duncan’s post 
hoc test. All behavioral data are reported in Figure 6.6. 
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One-way ANOVAs, with group as the between-subject variable, were conducted to test the 
group differences for the IRI and VAS subjective results. Moreover, correlations test were run 
to verify the influence of the subjective ratings on the IAT scores. 
 
6.3 RESULTS 
6.3.1 EXPERIMENT I 
Difference in implicit biases between healthy, patients and therapists 
The ANOVA for the IAT score (Figure 6.2) revealed significant differences across groups 
(F(2,42) = 12.41; p < .001). The Duncan’s post hoc test for multiple comparisons showed no 
differences in mean IAT scores between paraplegic patients and healthy controls (P = 0.34, H 
= 0.48; p = 0.81); meaning that both groups have an implicit positive bias for walking people. 
Crucially, in therapists group IAT values (T = -0.11) were significantly different both from 
paraplegic patients (p <0.001) and healthy controls (p =0.002). This means that physical 
therapists showed an opposite implicit behavior compared to paraplegic patients and healthy 
subjects; i.e. they showed a strong implicit and positive bias towards paraplegic patients.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Figure 6.2 Difference in implicit bias between the groups. The IAT scores in three groups of subjects 
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(individuals with spinal cord injuries, healthy individuals and physical therapists) are reported. The error bars 
indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM). The black bars indicate significant results from the post hoc 
comparisons (p < 0.05). 
 
Association between implicit bias and years of group-membership	  
Interestingly, we found a significant inverse correlation between the IAT scores of physical 
therapists and their years of working experience with SCI patients (mean = 8.7 years, r = -
0.63; p = 0.01); meaning that the more they worked with patients the less they show the bias 
(Figure 6.3).  
On the contrary there was no significant correlation between the IAT scores of SCI patients 
and the time since injury (mean = 7.7 years, r = -0.28; p > 0.3). 
	  
Figure 6.3 Association between implicit bias and years of group-membership in physical therapists. The 
IAT scores in physical therapists are negatively correlated with years of group’s membership. 
	  
Difference in the explicit preference between the groups 
The ANOVA for the explicit walking/paraplegic (Figure 6.4) preference revealed a significant 
effect of group (p <0.001). In particular the Duncan’s post-hoc test revealed that the group of 
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physical therapists was the only one who did not show any kind of explicit preference (T = 0). 
This result differed both from healthy subjects, who showed the highest explicit preference 
for walking people (H = 4.6, p = 0.009), and from patients with SCI, who explicitly declared 
to prefer paraplegic patients (P = -4.6, p = 0.01). Moreover patients with SCI and healthy 
subjects differed from each other (p < 0.001) showing the opposite direction of explicit 
preference. 
                
Figure 6.4 Difference in the explicit preference between the groups. The explicit preference score in three 
groups of subjects (individuals with spinal cord injuries, healthy individuals and physical therapists) is reported. 
The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM). The black bars indicate significant results from the 
post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05). 
 
IRI  
Concerning the IRI questionnaire results (Figure 6.5), the ANOVAs revealed a significant 
effect of interaction (F(6,123) = 4.23, p < 0.001). In particular Duncan’s post hoc test revealed 
that in Perspective Taking (P = 15.8, H = 20.7, T = 19.3) patients with SCI obtained 
significantly lower scores than healthy controls (p =0.003) and therapists (p =0.03), which did 
not differ from each other (p =0.4). Similarly, in Empathy Concern (P = 15.3, H = 19.8, T = 
18.8) patients with SCI showed lower scores than healthy controls (p =0.006) and therapists 
(p =0.03), which again did not differ from each other (p =0.5). Differently, in the Fantasy 
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Scale (P =13.5, H =16.0, T=12.2) paraplegic patients showed similar scores both compared to 
healthy controls (p = 0.14) and therapists (p = 0.36), which differed from each other (p 
=0.02). In the Personal Distress subscale (P =12.1, H =9.6, T =7.1) patients with SCI showed 
comparable scores with healthy controls (p = 0.11), but differed from physical therapists (p = 
0.001), which did not differ from healthy controls (p = 0.09).  
 
 
Figure 6.5 Difference in the Interpersonal Reactivity Index between the groups. The IRI scores in three 
groups of subjects (individuals with spinal cord injuries, healthy individuals and physical therapists) are 
reported, for the 4 subscales. The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM). The black bars 
indicate significant results from the post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05). 
 
6.3.2. EXPERIMENT 2 
IAT Scores 
The ANOVA for the IAT scores (Figure 6.6) revealed a main effect of group (F(1,28) = 5.7; p = 
0.02) and a main effect of session (F(1,28) = 7.9; p = 0.008) as well as a significant effect of 
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interaction (F(1,28) = 4.65; p = 0.03). The Duncan’s post-hoc test for multiple comparisons, 
showed that in the pre test session the two groups did not differ from each other, showing the 
same implicit positive bias toward walking people (Group1 = 0.46, Group2 = 0.59; p = 0.51). 
Crucially, in the post session test, subjects who underwent the social active interaction 
showed a significant decreasing of their bias (Group1 = 0.05), which was different both from 
their bias in the pre test session (p = 0.001) and from the post session bias of subjects who 
underwent just the passive listening (Group2 = 0.54, p = 0.01). Moreover, subjects who 
underwent just the passive listening did not show any difference between the pre and the post 
session test (p = 0.64) confirming their bias.  
 
Figure 6.6 Difference in implicit bias between the two groups. The IAT scores in two groups of subjects 
(active interaction vs. passive listening groups) are reported. The error bars indicate the standard error of the 
mean (SEM). The asterisk indicates significant results from the post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05). 
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IRI & Explicit preference 
IRI scores and VAS subjective ratings on explicit preference didn’t show any significant 
difference between the two groups in both pre- and post manipulation session (all p > 0.5). No 
correlations were found between any of these variables and the IAT scores in the pre or the 
post session test. 
 
6.4 DISCUSSION  
The present study explored the presence of bias toward wheelchair-bound patients with spinal 
cord injury (SCI) and revealed four key findings, which importantly contribute to the implicit 
versus explicit manner of biases as well as to their plasticity. First, healthy participants do 
indeed show an implicit and explicit preference towards healthy subjects. Second, there is a 
dissociation between implicit and explicit in-group behavior in patients with SCI: while they 
explicitly declared an in-group preference they implicitly showed an out-group (i.e. healthy) 
preference. Third, physical therapists do not show any implicit or explicit bias and this effect 
is modulated by their actual experience with patients. Fourth, real and active social interaction 
leads to drastic changes of the bias, which has important real-life applications.  
Together, our results suggest that thinking about disability is very different from the feelings 
we actually experience during interactions with individuals on a wheelchair. The opportunity 
to overcome disability prejudice through the promotion of pro-social inter/intra-group 
relationships is a challenging issue that can be used to promote the development of specific 
form of pro-social behavior. 
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Difference between implicit and explicit attitudes  
Implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) modes of thought have been often theorized as 
separate mental entities. The idea that the two constructs are essentially dissociated so that 
one component may drive in opposition to the other can be found in Freud’s (1933) and in 
psychodynamic proposals about prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 
1949), but also in cognitive psychology and modern neuroscience. Unconscious cognitive 
processes have been deeply examined in the light of implicit and explicit mental processes 
(Kihlstrom, 1987; Schacter & Tulving, 1994). Theoretical and methodological developments 
have supported the interest in implicit social cognition, including implicit stereotyping and 
prejudice (Bargh, 1994; Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Derived from models of 
the cognitive psychology, implicit prejudice can be defined as the automatic cognitive 
association between a social group and negative evaluation (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995). A great deal of work has repeatedly supported the notion of dissociation 
between implicit and explicit attitudes, showing that implicit socio-cognitive processes have 
the ability to be qualitatively and quantitatively discrepant from explicit ones. These results 
suggest that although explicit attitudes are usually reflecting no bias, implicit attitudes are 
negative toward out-groups. 
In our experiment healthy individuals who scored high in explicit preference, also scored high 
on the implicit one; similarly physical therapists which did not show any explicit preference, 
behaved consistently and coherently also in the implicit task. These data suggests that implicit 
and explicit attitudes may not be as dissociated as once thought. Recent findings have shown 
correlations between these types of measures (Cunningham et al., 2001; Gawronski, 2002; 
Kawakami et al., 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Interestingly, these 
correlations can be highly variable depending on the particular attitude being measured 
(Nosek et al., 2002), the degree to which the attitude is elaborated (Nosek, 2004), motivation 
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to control prejudiced reactions (Devine et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995), or the degree to which 
societal norms allow for the explicit expression of prejudice toward the group (Franco & 
Maass, 1999). In this sense, claim to have an explicit preference for walking people may be 
socially acceptable for our healthy participants, who have not felt the need to control their 
answers and to hide this preference when measured in a non-discriminatory way, free of 
negative connotations towards the out-group. Interestingly, this is not the case of studies on 
racial bias, where usually people feel very high motivations to consciously control their 
prejudice and a big difference between implicit and explicit is usually found. 
On the other hand, patients with SCI behaved in a completely different way. They showed 
dissociation between implicit and explicit in-group behavior. In particular they explicitly 
declared to prefer paraplegic individuals (in-group preference) but implicitly showed a 
preference for walking ones (out-group preference). This might be due to the fact although it 
is well established that paraplegia results in dramatic lifestyle changes, little is understood 
about living in the community as an individual with SCI, especially from the first person 
perspective (O’Connor et al., 2004). Even if speculative we can draw some explanation to this 
dissociation. Although from the explicit and cognitive point of view most patients with SCI 
know to be in a new life condition (i.e. part of a new in-group) and consider themselves to be 
“individuals with a wheelchair” or “enwheeled individuals” (Papadimitriou, 2008); some may 
still consider themselves to be more close to the previous in-group (namely the walking 
people), if not from a physical point of view, at least from a psychological one. Moreover, 
despite their new physical condition, most patients with SCI continue to attend the 
environments and to meet the people who were used before the injury, which would help to 
strengthen the implicit and prior preference for walking people. 
Our data suggest that although implicit and explicit attitudes may be dissociated when directly 
compared and may be discrete systems, a greater permeability between these systems of 
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prejudice may exist. The bidirectional link between implicit and explicit attitudes may 
indicate that both implicit and explicit prejudices are part of a more general system of 
preference for one’s own group relative to out-groups. Two plausible theories regarding the 
correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes claim (a) that implicit and explicit attitude 
measures tap the same attitude construct (single-factor hypothesis) and (b) that implicit and 
explicit attitudes are completely dissociated (full dissociation hypothesis). Further studies are 
still needed in this direction to evaluate the specific loading of both implicit and explicit 
aspects in the creation and extinction of the prejudice. 
 
Experience-dependent effects on biases 
Although health care professionals’ negative attitudes toward disability may affect successful 
rehabilitation outcomes and reintegration into the community (Chubon, 1982; Paris, 1993), 
very little as been written about their personal perception on disability. A study from White & 
Olson (1998) showed that the majority of the healthcare professionals had positive attitudes 
toward people with disabilities. Despite this, people with disability often detect inappropriate 
staff attitudes and behaviors as the biggest obstacle to health services (Carter & Markham, 
2001; Byron & Dieppe, 2009). The majority of these studies involved occupational therapy 
students but the literature on the influence of actual experience in shaping physiotherapists’ 
attitudes is more restricted (French, 1994, 1995, 2000a, b, c; French and Swain, 1997). As 
part of the validation of the Interaction with Disabled Persons scale, Gething (1993) studied 
the attitudes of practicing physiotherapists towards disabled persons and emphasized the 
importance of the first interaction, highlighting that it is not the prior contact per se that is the 
critical factor, but the nature and dynamics of this interaction. Moreover, while practice 
setting, age and educational level has no significant effect on healthcare professionals’ 
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attitude scores, their actual experience seemed to be correlated with higher attitudes values 
(White & Olson, 1998). 
To our best knowledge our study is the first one that allows an evaluation of both implicit and 
explicit attitude of physiotherapists towards people with disabilities. Different than normal 
healthy participants, physical therapists do not show an implicit or explicit bias towards their 
patients. Interestingly, the lack of bias is dependent on the amount of time working with these 
patients; the more they worked with patients the less they show the bias. Congruently, a 
recent study (Tervo et al., 2004) reported that years of experience and hours per week 
employed predicted comfort with challenging rehabilitation situations. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that contact with disabled individuals influences attitudes 
in a positive way (Stachura and Garven, 2003; Vargo and Semple, 1988; Lyons, 1991; 
Gething, 1992; Oermann and Lindgren, 1995; Paris, 1993). Interestingly, a positive attitude 
refers also to the belief that people with disability can be productive community members. 
This expectation seems to be in the opposite direction compared to the SCM (Cuddy et al., 
2007; Fiske et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002), which classified disabled people as low in the 
competence dimension. In this sense, physical therapists seem to be impermeable to the 
influence of the SCM. 
 
A concrete application of the social contact hypothesis. 
We are all influenced by social stereotypes (Devine, 1989). The first step toward a positive 
modification is to recognize negative thoughts and feelings and make a conscious effort to 
change them without being influenced. 
Some studies inquired the behavioral effects of completing the IAT: being informed about our 
potential bias through a direct and concrete personal experience, such as that provided by the 
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IAT, may contribute to improve the consciousness of people toward their implicit behavior. 
Making people aware of their intergroup bias is a good first step toward reducing it (Devine, 
1989; Monteith & Mark, 2005). Many discussions on prejudice reduction suggest that 
enhancing people’s awareness of bias and of their limited control over their responses could 
cause them to better regulate their intergroup behavior, which in turn could have a beneficial 
effect on the signals they transfer to out-group members. Even if this is possible, it seems 
more likely that some other factors intervene. 
The active contact between in-group and out-group members and the perception of a common 
identity have been indicated as useful strategies for the reduction of prejudice (Brown & 
Hewstone, 2005). Under some conditions, direct contact between members of different groups 
can reduce stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. Allport  (1954) has firstly described 
this phenomenon in his social contact hypothesis. When a member of a majority group meets 
with a minority group member and the experience is a positive one, an attitude change on two 
levels will result: a target-specific approach change and a new positive and generalized 
attitude toward the group as a whole. Initial assumptions about the other, which arise from the 
(negative) stereotypes, are replaced by more positive perceptions of the individual and its 
original group. 
The contact hypothesis contains a long list of conditions for a successful contact (Amir, 1969, 
1976). However, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000), in their meta-analysis of contact studies, have 
found that it is not necessary that all of Allport's conditions be present simultaneously for bias 
to be reduced. In our study the effect of a real, active, social interaction leads to drastic 
changes of the bias. Importantly, passively increasing knowledge about the disability did not 
lead to a similar result. 
The hypothesis of the social contact has a great practical importance for interventions in the 
promotion of cross-categorical contact and the reduction of bias. Not only the positive and 
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direct contact between members of different groups can reduce stereotyping, but also indirect 
contact can have positive effects on this reduction (Wright et al., 1997). Knowing that a 
member of our group has a contact with a member of the out-group seems to be sufficient to 
reduce prejudice. One of the limits of this theory is that individuals may activate mechanisms 
to neutralize the influence of dissonant and unexpected information arising from the positive 
contact (i.e. the use of cognitive explanations, the attribution of positive effects to external 
factors or the reduction of future interaction) making the positive contact with out-group 
members not effective or insufficient in the reduction of the negative attitude. Additionally 
organizing meetings among members of opposing groups raises both logistical and financial 
issues. 
Despite these questions remain yet unanswered, we believe that the advantages of using the 
social interaction for an out-group contact are exceptionally promising. We have shown how 
even a short intervention, has the power of changing implicit bias and we advocate the 
introduction of inter/intra-group relationships as a vital part of both health care and social 
contexts. Interestingly, it remains still to investigate how stable and durable are these effects. 
This should also be investigated from a neuroanatomical point of view, for example, by 
exploring possible changes of the BOLD signal in brain areas of pain representation during 
observations of in-group/out-group members.  
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The impairment of the motor, sensory and autonomic systems in SCI can have a devastating 
effect on function (Yu, 1998) and tremendous efforts are undertaken to identify the clinically 
most important mechanisms involved in recovery after SCI. Studying the effects of sensory 
loss on body, action and tool representations, as well as social interactions, provides a glimpse 
into the role played by afferent information on the bodily self and related cognition. The 
general aim of this project was to explore the relation between the actual bodily states of 
patients with spinal cord injury and the possible changes in different aspects of cognition, 
affection and social behavior. We provided evidence that bodily states, such as the lesion 
level and the extensive wheelchair use, affect both the subjective experience of tool 
embodiment and the motor auditory mapping. Moreover, we showed that social preferences 
and personal interactions could be modulated by new interpersonal social dynamics. Taken 
together our results allow some important considerations. 
 
7.1 Embodiment, disembodiment, re-embodiment 
Most patients with SCI perceive that their legs are still their own (Lenggenhager et al., 2012), 
despite their inability to use or feel them (Cole, 2004). Although the patients do not confuse 
their body parts with their wheelchair (Nizzi et al., 2012), some do consider themselves to be 
“individuals with a wheelchair,” whereas others regard themselves as “enwheeled 
individuals” (Papadimitriou, 2008; Cole, 2004). This identity or “wholeness” discrepancy 
prompted us to investigate whether the somatomotor deafferentation/deefferentation of 
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disconnected body segments and the exposure to/experience with the wheelchair, affects 
corporeal awareness of embodiment. To explore the presence of any such relationship, in 
Chapter 3 we presented a novel developed questionnaire regarding wheelchair-related 
feelings. We used a principal component analysis (PCA) to estimate the factors that are 
involved in the sub-aspects of tool embodiment in relation to lesion level. PCA revealed the 
presence of three major components. Among all participants included in the study, a 
significant number experienced the wheelchair as being internal to the corporeal boundary, so 
that the regular use of a wheelchair induces the perception that the body’s edges are not fixed, 
but are instead plastic and flexible to include the wheelchair, suggesting a revision in the body 
image. Patients with lesions in the lower spinal cord, and loss of movement and sensation in 
the legs but spared upper body movement, showed a higher degree of functional embodiment 
than those with lesions in the upper spinal cord and impairment in the entire body. In the case 
of an upper spinal cord lesion, much more than in the case of a lower spinal cord lesion, there 
is a more pronounced reduction of strength and functionality in the entire body as well as an 
overall lack of feeling of touch. Such impairment interferes with the feeling of the wheelchair 
in direct contact with the body and with the regular status that updates the enwheeled body in 
motion. The corporeal awareness of the tool emerges not merely as an extension of the body 
but as a substitute for (and part of) the functional self. This assistive device offers the 
possibility, at least in principle, to partially “repair” the motor functionality of the damaged 
body part (Murray 2004; Pereira et al., 1996) and appears conceived not as an object to move 
but as a mediator of the limbs’ action. This reorganization of the body model is consistent 
with the positive inclusion of the wheelchair to accommodate physical impairment and restore 
mobility (Papadimitriou, 2008; Standal, 2011; Arnhoff & Mehl, 1963; Higuchi et al., 2004, 
Higuchi et al., 2009; Merleau-Ponty, 2002). Since body representations take into account 
every perceptual input related to the body, it is reasonable to think that it should be plastic 
enough to update accordingly to slow and fast changes the body undergoes with time. A series 
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of studies demonstrated a relationship between changes in the physical body structure and 
body representations at different levels (Serino & Haggard, 2010; Ramachandran et al., 1992; 
Farnè et al., 2002; Di Russo et al., 2006; Taylor-Clarle et al., 2004; de Vignemont et al., 2005; 
Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2010; Gandevia & Phegan, 1999). However, one of 
the best examples revealing a direct link between primary cortical activity at the level of the 
primary somatosensory cortex and body representation is indeed represented by 
deafferentation (Dijkerman & De Haan, 2007). 
Altogether, data presented in Chapter 3 suggest that the subjective experience of the 
embodiment of an external tool in patients with SCI is a complex, multifarious process that 
requires the following: a feeling of ownership over the tool (including a long-lasting coherent 
and accurate representation); online multisensory integration, referenced on the state of the 
body (including the effective regulation of sensorimotor information flow); and, finally the 
self-attributed control of the physical body and its movement. One potential study limitation 
was the use of introspective data and PCA, which, although an elegant and powerful tool 
(Longo et al., 2008), needs to include empirical measures. Therefore, in the study presented in 
Chapter 4, we aimed to establish the effect of sensorimotor loss and specific use of 
wheelchair, on embodiment processes. 
 
Many theories have proposed an association between the perception and execution of actions, 
suggesting that both are coded according to a common representational format (Prinz, 1997, 
Brass et al., 2001, Brass et al., 2000, Craighero et al., 2002, Kilner et al., 2003, Sturmer et al., 
2000, Repp and Knoblich, 2007). Neural studies in healthy (Gazzola et al., 2006, Rizzolatti et 
al., 1996, Doehrmann et al., 2010) and brain-damaged (Pazzaglia et al., 2008) individuals 
indicate that action perception and execution rely on largely overlapping neural substrates. 
However, it is still unclear whether lifelong (mobility by lower limbs) and newly acquired 
(mobility by WHC) perceptual and motor experiences differently impact the integrity of 
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action-perception mapping. In the study presented in Chapter 4, we address this issue by 
testing aural discrimination ability in different samples of participants using sounds that arose 
from wheelchair, upper limb, lower limb, and animal actions. Our results indicate that an 
inability to move the lower limbs in patients with SCI did not lead to impairment in the 
discrimination of lower limb-related action sounds. Importantly, patients with SCI 
discriminated wheelchair sounds better than individuals with comparable auditory experience 
(i.e. physical therapists) and inexperienced, able-bodied subjects. 
Alteration of the action network involved in the perception of human motor acts may occur 
even in the absence of a cortical lesion, such as in blind (Ricciardi et al., 2009, Lewis et al., 
2011), deaf (Alaerts et al., 2011) and SCI (Arrighi et al., 2011) individuals. These results 
prompted us to investigate whether the somatosensory deafferentation and motor 
deefferentation of specific body parts alter the audio-motor mapping of actions generated by 
the affected body part. In the visual domain patients with SCI exhibit reduced perceptual 
sensitivity when compared to the biological motion of the point-light displays of the entire 
body (Arrighi et al., 2011) and specific impairments in the visual perception of form and 
action in the disconnected body parts (Pernigo et al., 2012). However, data presented in 
Chapter 4 gave psychophysical evidence that paraplegic patients recognize lower and upper 
limb actions as efficiently as able-bodied individuals. Several mechanisms such as brain 
plasticity (Bunge et al., 1993; Bunge et al., 1997; Guest et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2004; 
Cariga et al., 2002), motor mirroring (Costantini et al., 2005), reinforced memory (Nico et al., 
2004), training exercises and motor imagery (Fiorio et al., 2006), may explain the 
preservation of perceptual signaling referred to the paralyzed portion of the body following 
SCI. The preservation of the perceptual ability in SCI patients suggests that the cortical 
regions involved in action simulation could play a compensatory role and facilitate the 
maintenance of intact audio-motor resonance in patients with impaired lower limb motor 
functions. Moreover, findings shown in Chapter 4 highlight the unique role of motor practice 
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in learning ability. Individuals with SCI, when compared with auditory experts, can closely 
match aural perception with wheelchair-executed motion, enabling these patients to quickly 
extract and discriminate relevant WHC sounds. Visual and auditory wheelchair familiarity, 
although not fundamental, certainly plays a role in the discrimination of its sound. Although 
the physical therapists did not demonstrate the same ability as the wheelchair-bound subjects 
in recognizing the WHC sounds, the mere “observation/audition” ability of the wheelchair-
bound subjects enhanced their WHC sound discrimination ability when compared with 
healthy subjects. The acquisition of motor skills through physical vs. perceptual practice may 
imply a highly selective coupling of perceptual-motor information. The striking effects of 
perceptual-motor practice with specific objects induce long-term structural changes in 
monkey (Quallo et al., 2009) and in human (Bassolino et al., 2010, Aglioti et al., 2008; 
Canzoneri et al., 2013) body representations. We believe that this action-dependent 
embodiment phenomenon is triggered from the changes in tool, action and body 
representations, documented by the present experiments. This proposal has been recently 
introduced by our group in the context of a neural network model designed to account for the 
decision process in the sound matching process, presented in Chapter 5. 
The evidence that patients with SCI can distinguish WHC sounds from other distracting 
sounds more rapidly than individuals with no direct perceptual or motor wheelchair 
experience gives the empirical measure that was lacking in Chapter 3. SCI patients probably 
redefine or modify their motor abilities, appropriating the action schema to include the actual 
features of the wheelchair, so that the subjective personal experience of wheelchair 
embodiment descripted in Chapter 3, finds in Chapter 4 its functional translation. In 
individuals with SCI, the brain does not lose its perceptual ability to function properly. 
Instead, audio-motor associations appear to be modified and enhanced to incorporate external 
salient tools that now represent extensions of their body schemas. This particular example of 
neural plasticity is a formidable opportunity to forge novel treatments that intervene with new 
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essential objects to regain and extend the potentiality of physically impaired individuals. The 
exclusive plastic effect of physical (as opposed to perceptual) learning on the development of 
new action perception abilities suggests that it is essential for people to experience close 
sensorimotor associations in order to forge new learning opportunities (Serino et al., 2007, 
Bassolino et al., 2010). 
 
7.2 The importance of intergroup contact  
Embodied accounts of social cognition argue that body representations play a causal role in 
sociocognitive processing (Gallese et al., 2004). These shared bodily representations for self 
and other may be particularly important for empathy and other core sociocognitive processes 
such as stereotype, as they can afford us a unique, first-person understanding of the 
experiences of others. People often report empathizing with the trials and tribulations of 
others. While some accounts characterize empathy as a general tendency that individuals 
possess to differing degrees, an alternative, understudied view is that empathy emerges out of 
similarity-driven matches between potential targets and empathizers. Actually, the activation 
of shared bodily representations for self and other has been shown to be modulated by 
whether the other person being observed is a member of in-group or out-group. The project 
presented in Chapter 6 examined whether these matches, even when not explicitly identified, 
influence social experiences, and whether this social relationship has consequences for 
implicit stereotyping toward people with disabilities. In two different experiments we 
explored the presence of stereotypes toward patients with spinal cord injury (SCI) and we 
then investigated if such hardwired biases could be modified by a personal interaction with an 
individual with SCI. Our findings revealed that SCI patients and healthy subjects showed an 
implicit preference toward healthy individuals and that the opposite was true for the 
therapists. In addition, we found that subjects who underwent a significant active social 
interaction showed a weaker and non-significant bias. 
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The effects of implicit bias have important implications for social cognition, sociocognitive 
processes, empathy, mental simulation and prosocial behavior. Results from our studies 
shows that social interaction is not only sensitive to the presence of stereotypes but is also 
shaped by actual interactions with others and, more specifically, by active social exchange 
with other people during the interaction. While previous work has shown that empathy can 
arise out of the dispositional tendencies that individuals possess, the current study 
demonstrates that previous social experience between individuals of different groups can 
influence social relations with- and evaluations of- out-group members. Active social contact 
between groups not only reduces the disability bias, but may also influence expectations for 
future relationship. Philosophical considerations as well as neurophysiology, 
neuropsychology, and behavioral evidence converged in showing that body representation is 
of fundamental importance for the individual, being the medium for every social interaction. 
It is worth noting, however, the relevance of emotional and motivational significance, such as 
previous experience, behaviors and knowledge about others. Our study opens up several lines 
of future research. First, it will be interesting to replicate the effect with different social 
groups and stereotypes. Second, our findings would be strengthened by replication using 
alternative measures of both implicit and explicit stereotype. Further research is also needed 
to investigate in more depth the nature of the implicit attitudes modulated by self-other bodily 
representation. 
 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
In order to entirely account for the different aspects of body experience involved in 
interaction with the environment, complex higher-level multimodal representations of the 
body in the brain must exist, supporting perceptual, motor and emotional functions, and, 
ultimately, underlying the experience of having a body and the ability of using that body to 
interact with the external world. 
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An unconscious body model, the body schema, which enables motor control and reflects the 
proprioceptive, tactile inputs of how the body is “felt”, may regulate the functional aspects of 
embodiment considerably. Indeed, the compensatory flexibility of wheelchair embodiment 
observed in patients with SCI is linearly linked to their ability to feel and move their body in 
the space again. The online information regarding movement in a wheelchair is a prerequisite 
for the capacity to feel that one’s own body generates the event and one has control over it. 
Indeed, an objective and quantitative evaluation of changes in patients with spinal cord 
lesions help identify the cause that may preclude the experience of self-attribution and 
embodiment of a tool. United harmony between the body and the tool may be key for the 
embodied experience of success or rejection of an assistive device. Embodying a wheelchair 
may enhance the efficiency and safety of movement, thereby reducing bodily effort and the 
damage produced by its use. This ease of use may lead to greater autonomy and self-
organization, thus allowing patients to benefit from the opportunities offered by the 
environment in which they move. 
The finding of preservation of audio motor representation after complete SCI has important 
implications for basic science research. A variety of experimental therapies are emerging to 
promote regeneration of the injured spinal cord, including the application of neurotrophic 
factors (Kwon et al., 2002), drug therapy (Baptiste and Fehlings, 2006), and cell-based 
therapies (Guest et al., 2005). If regeneration of the injured spinal cord, and thus reconnection 
of the brain to the muscles, is possible, it is vital that the brain must still be able to activate in 
a way that will generate movement. Specifically, the capacity to embody new objects may 
extend an individual’s physical impaired ability and remains a potentially unexploited 
resource for the growing population of those who are severely disabled. 
Most of the studies presented in this dissertation investigated how the representation of action 
and body changes as a function of interaction with an artificial object. Critically, in everyday 
life the distinction between successful and unsuccessful exchange is meaningful not only in 
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terms of object interaction, but mainly in terms of social interaction. The hypothesis that 
social contact decreases implicit negative stereotype has great practical importance for 
interventions in the promotion of cross-categorical contact and the reduction of bias. Not only 
the positive and direct contact between members of different groups can moderate 
stereotyping, but also indirect contact can have positive effects on this reduction (Wright et 
al., 1997). Negative implicit attitudes towards out-groups are formed at an early age, and 
remain relatively stable throughout adulthood (Baron & Banaji, 2006). We have shown that 
inducing intergroup contact may attenuate these persistent implicit social biases, altering the 
perceived boundaries between in-group and out-group. Our results begin to ‘bridge the gap’ 
between the basic, perceptual representation of self and other, and the complex social 
mechanisms underlying much of our everyday social interaction.  
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APPENDIX A 
Additional clinical information about spinal cord injury 
In all complete spinal cord lesions, sensation is lost below the level, and because people do 
not feel they can injury themselves without awareness. They have to be aware of skin care to 
prevent burns and, especially, pressure ulcers. In addition there are a number of other 
functions altered or lost because of spinal cord injury. Temperature regulation can be a 
problem, because patients cannot shiver, sweat, or control blood vessels’ dilatation and 
constriction below their level. The latter may also be the reason for autonomic dysreflexia. 
Cervical spinal cord injury leads to a brief initial period of hypertension, caused by the release 
of epinephrine and norepinephrine from the adrenal medulla. This is followed by the 
autonomic equivalent of the spinal shock, in which sympathetic activity is greatly reduced. 
Cardiovascular manifestations include hypotension and bradycardia, as a result of demised 
sympathetic outflow from thoracic segment. Over a longer time, spinal sympathetic reflexes 
become hyperactive, and autonomic dysreflexia commonly develops. Noxious stimuli that 
would normally cause a moderate sympathetic response lead instead to massive 
vasoconstriction and potentially life-threatening hypertension (Vaccaro & Fehlings, 2010). A 
large increases in blood pressure can suddenly occur, which present as severe headache and 
sweating over the forehead caused by dilatation of the normally controlled blood vessels of 
the head and neck, connected to the brain by the intact cervical cord, in response to a rise in 
blood pressure following a problem in the area of body below the level of the lesion. Bladder 
dilatation is a potent cause of this but some people have dysreflexia during rehabilitation 
when they are first raised to the vertical. This is a medical emergency, with stroke a real 
possibility if the blood pressure is not immediately reduced. The rise in blood pressure is all 
the worse because tetraplegics normally live with lower blood pressure than able-bodied 
people. Also muscle spasms can be a real problem in those with lesions above the lumbar 
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cord. Initially after spinal injury there is a loss of all reflex activity, known as “spinal shock”. 
But then, over months, reflexes become abnormally active, which can lead to huge spasms in 
response to relatively innocuous stimuli. Lastly, people with spinal cord injury have to live 
with a variety of pain. Roughly 60-65 percent of people have pain, and in 20-25 percent is 
severe. This may reflect damage to the nerve roots at the site of the lesion, or elsewhere. Later 
it may also be the result of shoulder arthritis after years of transfers to and from the chair, for 
example. Lastly, among the most troubling types of pain are “neuropathic pain” and  
“phantom pain”, perceived in the area of the body below the level of the cord damage in an 
area that cannot be usually felt.  
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Table 4.2 List of the sounds of the auditory discrimination action task described in 
Chapter 4. A complete list of the category of 10 sets of three sounds used in the matching-to-
sample auditory discrimination action task described in Chapter 4 is provided. Each sound 
depicts upper (URAS) and lower (LRAS) limb-related action sounds, wheelchair-related action 
sounds (WRAS), and animal action-related sounds (AARS). In each category, the sample, the 
matching and the non-matching sound stimuli are indicated in the first, second and third rows 
of each of the 10 sound sets, respectively. The sounds were chosen on the basis of two 
psychophysics studies. During the test-creation phase, healthy subjects who did not 
subsequently participate in the study listened to each sound and assessed how easily it could 
be identified. The selection of the auditory stimuli was based on the results of a preliminary 
psychophysics study involving 20 healthy participants (11 men, 22–34 years of age). Each 
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participant listened to each sound and chose between two verbal tags. Only one tag correctly 
described the sound; the other tag was used as a realistic distractor. Only the sounds that were 
correctly matched by at least 80% of the participants were used in the subsequent study. Ten 
groups of three sounds formed every trial set for each sound action category that was chosen 
for use in the final test. The test performances of 10 healthy participants (3 men; mean age, 
23.6 ± 4.8 years) were assessed. No differences were observed in the recognition rate of the 
URAS (mean, 88%; range, 70–100%), LRAS (mean, 85%; range, 75–91%), WRAS (mean, 80%; 
range, 70–100%), or ARAS (mean, 90%; range, 75–100%) action sounds (P > 0.8).  
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